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Abstract
Are we better together? Versions of this question have been heard repeatedly around
Europe on the aftermath of the Great Recession. On the Eurozone, the suboptimal
design of the monetary union has contributed to create imbalances before the crisis
and slow recoveries after it. Meanwhile, tensions are arising in some fiscal unions
within the European Union, like the cases of Scotland in Great Britain or Catalonia
in Spain. On this thesis, I discuss three topics on monetary and fiscal unions.
The first chapter examines the effect of monetary unions on the competitiveness
of its members. In this paper, I explore the effect of the robust increase in public
wages following the introduction of the Euro on the overall loss of competitiveness
of the economies of the Eurozone periphery during the past decade. To that end, I
simulate the drop on interest rates (risk premium) that these countries experienced
just before the introduction of the common currency within a DGSE model with
search and matching frictions and two sectors. I find that around 15% of the total
increase in private wages during the 1999-2007 period can be attributed to the public
wage channel, a mechanism described in the chapter.
Then, I turn my attention to fiscal unions. The second paper, joint with Rein-
hard Ellwanger, explores the relationship between fiscal decentralization and fiscal
policy effects. We document a positive relationship between decentralization and the
effectiveness of fiscal policy: on average, spending and revenue multipliers tend to be
larger in more decentralized countries. The second part of the paper is a case study
for the decentralization process in Spain. Using the narrative approach, we find that
shocks to decentralization have a positive impact on subsequent output growth, par-
ticularly for the decentralization of direct taxation competences. Finally, the third
i
chapter explores the relation between the degree of decentralization of a country and
its debt level. Contrary to the current literature and the prevailing public opinion, a
panel data analysis of 31 European countries over a 12 year period shows that higher
levels of regional decentralization have no effect on the levels of debt, even though it
affects their spending and taxation income.
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Chapter 1
The public wage channel on the
post-EMU loss of competitiveness
in the Eurozone periphery
1.1 Introduction
The loss of competitiveness of the peripheral economies of the Euro Area remains a
concern for the European authorities, starting even before the onset of the current
crises. The correction of these differentials on inflation, wages and productivity is
proving to be a painful process. Without independent monetary policy and limited
maneuvering room for fiscal policy, the governments of these economies have engaged
in costly internal devaluation to correct course and converge with the core of the
Eurozone.
The aforementioned differentials are reflected on imbalances on the real effective
exchange rates (REER) within the fixed exchange rates regime of the common cur-
rency. These imbalances can be quantified thanks to the European Central Bank’s
data on harmonized competitiveness indicators, based on unit labor costs indexes.
For every country, the indicator shows the REER calculated vis-a`-vis 20 trading
partners plus the other Euro Area countries. The REER of the main peripheral
1
1971-1998 1999-2008
Ireland 0.8 3.0
Spain -2.3 1.7
Portugal -0.3 1.7
Italy -0.1 1.4
Austria -0.1 0.2
France 0.3 -0.1
Germany -0.6 -0.1
Table 1.1: Annual growth of public wages minus annual growth of private wages.
economies of the Euro Area have appreciated markedly since their adoption of the
Euro until the end of 2007: a 31.3% in Ireland, a 16.1% for Spain, 13.5% for Italy
and 7.2% for Portugal; thereby hurting the competitiveness of their economies. By
comparison, the REER of France has appreciated at a much slower pace, a 4.3%,
whereas the REER of Austria and Germany actually depreciated, a 4.5% and 14.0%,
respectively.
At the same time that labor costs and wages were going up in some Euro Area
countries, public wages were going up even more. The wage premium paid to workers
in the public sector in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy went notably up. Table
1.1 presents data on the difference on average annual growth in wages per employee
between the public and the private sectors for the pre- and post-EMU period. As
can be seen in the table, public wages in the countries with the worst REER record
for the post-EMU period have risen well over private wages, in comparison with the
relative restraint of the northern countries on the post-EMU period or of all countries
in the pre-EMU period.
The increase in public wages can have a “pull-effect” on private wages. This
argument has been extensively documented on the literature, both theoretically and
empirically. Theoretically, just to name a couple of examples, in Quadrini and Trigari
(2007), Ardagna (2007) or Afonso and Gomes (2008) increases in public wages push
the private wage up by improving the outside option of workers, thereby affecting
wage bargaining. In Ferna´ndez-de-Co´rdoba, Pe´rez, and Torres (2012), the increase
in public wages crowds out private employment and so the private wage goes up,
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both because private employers need to match public wages to attract workers and
because workers are more productive via the increase in public good provision. Em-
pirically, Pe´rez and Sa´nchez (2010) found evidence of a public sector leadership role
in wage setting for Germany, Spain, France and Italy, albeit in conjunction with bi-
directional channels in the case of Germany and Spain. Also focusing on the causal
two-way relationship between the public and private wage settings, Lamo, Pe´rez,
and Schuknecht (2012) conclude that the private sector appears to have a stronger
influence. However, the public wage setting has stronger feedback effects than the
private wage setting, so that increases in public wages are likely to have strong effects
on private wages.
On the other hand, the introduction of the EMU had the potential to relax the
governments’ budget constraint, making it easier to observe wage increases not at-
tached to higher productivity. The reason for the relaxation of the budget constraint
was the reduction on borrowing costs. As can be observed in figure 1.1, during the
built-up to the introduction of the European common currency there was a reduc-
tion on the interest rate spread between the countries in the periphery of the Euro
area and its core. This trend reverted during 2007 with the beginning of the Great
Recession.
Therefore, the goal of this project is to evaluate the importance of the “public
wage channel” on the loss of competitiveness of Spain following the introduction of
the EMU. This channel works in the following way: the adoption of the Euro by
this country had the effect of decreasing significantly its costs of financing. The
subsequent relaxation of the budget constraint of the government (which can be
modeled as a risk premium shock) leads to the observed increases in public wages.
Finally, the higher public wages would have feedback effects on the private wages,
with the final effect being a deteriorating competitiveness with respect to the core
of the Euro Area, that was not affected by the drop on interest rates.
A hypothesis similar to this one was proposed by Johnston (2011). On her paper,
the author argues that the pre-EMU period was marked by the efforts of the countries
to meet the convergence criteria defined by the Maastricht Treaty. These efforts
limited the bargaining power of public unions, reducing the pressure they could exert
3
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Figure 1.1: 10-year Government bond yield, monthly average.
on their governments. Once in the Euro, the conditions of the Maastricht Treaty
were replaced with the softer conditions, in terms of enforceability, of the Growth
and Stability Pact. Therefore, public unions could again pressure their governments
for higher wages. On the other hand, private sector wages were constrained by the
higher competitive environment resulting from the newly created monetary union.
This way, the creation of the Euro led to an increase on the public wage premium:
the author estimates that wage growth on the EMU’s public sectors, relative to wage
growth in manufacturing, was on average 0.6 per cent higher per year than it was in
non-EMU and non-Maastricht years, on average for the whole EMU. This estimation
is consistent with the data of table 1.1. What the author fails to notice is that the
increase was focused exclusively in the peripheral economies, which were the ones
most affected by the reduction in their financing cost. This asymmetry would support
the hypothesis that it was changes in government financing conditions what led to
the increase in the public wage premium, not changes in the bargaining position of
the public unions.
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Even though public wage bargaining can probably be excluded as a causal mech-
anism, it is still an important part of the picture. In the articles considered in the
previous paragraphs, the public sector is usually modeled so as to follow exogenous
rules, either on wages, on vacancies or both. However, as shown in Gomes (2014),
if public jobs are safer, then the optimal policy for the public sector is to offer a
lower salary than in the private sector, to avoid “queuing” for public jobs, which
would increase unemployment. Given that we do not observe that in the data, but
quite the opposite, it is evident that public unions are an important player, pushing
up public wages. The influence of public unions will be introduced in the rules of
the public sector, with unions pushing up for higher wages when the fiscal deficit
of the government goes down; i.e., when unions perceive the governments’ budget
constraint to be looser.
Estimating this proposed wage rule can be difficult, as the government wage bill
itself is part of the evolution of the deficit. Instead, I estimate a public wage rule that
reacts to changes in interest payments by the government. Such a wage rule reflects
the reasoning developed during this introduction: a reduction in interest payments,
due to decreasing interest rates in this case, is interpreted by the unions as a sign of
a looser budget constraint and used as an argument to push wages up.
In the regression, I use data for Spain, Italy and Portugal from 1999 to 2007,
representing the period where the countries had already entered the Euro (and were
therefore not constrained by the Maastricht criteria) and before the beginning of the
crisis. Data is annual and taken from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 90. Public
wages (WG) are defined as real (base 2005) compensation rate of public employees
and computed in logs and the interest payments (IP ) are defined as net government
interest payments as a percentage of GDP. The estimating equation relates the log-
arithm of public wages log WGct to the interest payments IPct, controlling for total
government debt (DEBT , defined as Gross public debt, Maastricht criterion, as a
percentage of GDP) and unemployment (URATE, defined as unemployed workers
as percentage of active population):
where αc are country fixed effects, γt are year fixed effects and uc,t is an error
term clustered at the country level. The coefficient θ1 estimated is -0.166, which goes
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log WGc,t = αc + γt +ρ log WGc,t−1 +θ1 IPc,t +θ2 DEBTc,t +θ3 URATEc,t +uc,t
0.925∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗ -0.004 0.036
(0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
in the expected direction: an increase of interest payments reduces public wages and
vice versa. On the other hand, the value of the coefficient ρ of the lagged public
wage is 0.925; both values will be used later in the calibration for the persistence of
the wage rule and the reaction of the public wage to changes in interest payments.
In the next sections, I will construct and calibrate a DGSE model to replicate
the economy of Spain just before the introduction of the Euro and then simulate the
effects of the interest rate drop described above. The model includes two sectors,
searching frictions on the labor market, staggered wage bargaining, capital adjust-
ment costs and working capital.
1.2 The model
Labor market
The economy is populated by a measure one of agents and composed of two sectors:
a public and a private sector. At any point in time, agents are either working on
the public sector, working in the private sector or unemployed. In the private sector,
there is a continuum of infinitely lived firms of measure one, indexed by i. Each
private firm i employs npt (i) workers at time t. It also posts v
p
t (i) vacancies in order
to attract new workers for the next period of operation. Therefore, the total number
of private vacancies and employed workers are vpt =
∫ 1
0
vpt (i)di and n
p
t =
∫ 1
0
npt (i)di.
Denoting by ngt the number of workers employed in the public sector in period t,
then:
1 = ut + n
g
t + n
p
t (1.1)
Through the paper, a superindex p will be used to represent a private sector variable
and a superindex g to represent a public sector variable.
The evolution of employment in both sectors depends on the number of new
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matches mgt and m
p
t and on the separations that occur every period. Jobs are de-
stroyed at a constant fraction σj, different across sectors. The evolution of employ-
ment on each sector is then given by:
ngt+1 = (1− σg)ngt +mgt (1.2)
npt+1 = (1− σp)npt +mpt (1.3)
On the other hand, the new matches are determined by a Cobb-Douglas matching
function for each sector:
mgt = µ
g(ugt )
ηg(vgt )
1−ηg (1.4)
mpt = µ
p(upt )
ηp(vpt )
1−ηp (1.5)
Because I am assuming directed search, ujt represents the number of unemployed
workers looking for a job in sector j. Call st to the proportion of unemployed agents
looking for jobs in the public sector, so that ugt = stut and u
p
t = (1− st)ut. From the
matching functions, I can define the probabilities of vacancies being filled on each
sector as qjt and the job-finding rates conditional on searching in a particular sector
pjt :
qjt =
mjt
vjt
, pjt =
mjt
ujt
; j = g, p (1.6)
Households
Each household is infinitely lived and derives utility from private consumption ct
and public good gt, supplied by the government. It also derives utility from unem-
ployment ut, which captures leisure and home production. Following Merz (1995), I
assume that all incomes in the household are pooled so as to eliminate the possibility
of heterogeneity due to unemployment risk. Therefore, the problem of the household
is to maximize:
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt[u(ct, gt) + v(ut)] (1.7)
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subject to the laws of motion of employment (1.2) and (1.3), and the budget con-
straint in period t:
(1− τ c)ct + it + pitgt = [rt − τ k(rt − δ)]kt + (1− τn)(wgtngt +wptnpt ) + but + Πt (1.8)
where wjt for j = g, p is the wage on each sector, rt is the return to capital, b are
unemployment benefits, δ is the depreciation rate, Πt encompasses transfers from
the government and (potentially) profits from the firm, τ c, τn and τ k are taxes on
consumption, labor and capital (allowing for depreciation), respectively, and pit is
the relative price of the public good.
Finally, capital evolves over time according to:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it − ω
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt (1.9)
where ω
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt are adjustment costs, paid by the household.
Therefore, denoting the Lagrange multipliers of the budget constraint and the
laws of motion of the public and private employment as λct , λ
ng
t and λ
np
t , respectively,
the FOCs of the households’ problem are:
(ct) λ
c
t(1− τ c) = Uc,t (1.10)
(gt) λ
c
tpit = Ug,t (1.11)
(st) λ
ng
t p
g
t = λ
np
t p
p
t (1.12)
(ngt+1) λ
ng
t = β
{
Uu,t+1 +Et
[
λct+1[(1− τn)wgt+1 − b] + λngt+1(1− σg − pgt+1)
] }
(1.13)
(npt+1) λ
np
t = β
{
Uu,t+1 +Et
[
λct+1[(1− τn)wpt+1 − b] + λnpt+1(1− σp − ppt+1)
] }
(1.14)
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(kt+1) λ
c
t
[
1 + ω
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)]
=
βEtλ
c
t+1
{
1− δ + rt+1 − τk(rt+1 − δ) + ω
2
[(
kt+2
kt+1
)2
− 1
]}
(1.15)
Private good production
Each private good firm produces the consumption good with labor, capital and public
good,1
yt(i) = at[n
p
t (i)]
(1−ϕp)[kt(i)]ϕp(gt)ϕpg (1.16)
where at is an aggregate technology shock that follows an AR(1) process with per-
sistence ρa and standard deviation σa. Following Gertler and Trigari (2009), because
there will be wage dispersion across firms, I replace the assumption of fixed costs of
posting a vacancy with quadratic labor adjustment costs on the hiring rate, xpt (i),
defined as the ratio of new hires to the existing private workforce:
xpt (i) =
qpt v
p
t (i)
npt (i)
(1.17)
For simplicity, I assume capital is perfectly mobile across firms and that there is a
competitive rental market for capital. The price of the good is normalized to one.
Firms use working capital as in Neumeyer and Perri (2005) or Mendoza (2010): they
take intra-period loans at the international rate Rt to finance a fraction θ of their
wage bill. Finally, since current hires give future value, the optimization problem
is dynamic and firms maximize the discounted value of future profits. The problem
1Notice how the public good both gives utility to the household and is an input in the private
production function. Public goods in this model are, for example, hospitals or highways, that are
valuable to the individual but also increase the productivity of the firm (through healthier workers
and lower transport costs, in these cases).
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becomes:
Qp(npt (i), k
p
t (i)) = max
kt(i),v
p
t (i)
{yt(i)− [1 + θRt]wpt (i)npt (i)− rtkt(i)−
κ
2
[xpt (i)]
2npt (i)
+ Et[Λt,t+1Q
p(npt+1(i), kt+1(i))]} (1.18)
where κ is the a parameter for the adjustment costs and Λt,t+1 = β
Uct+1
Uct
is the
stochastic discount factor. The firm maximizes profits by choosing the number of
vacancies posted and its capital stock, taking as given its existing employment stock,
the probability of filling a vacancy, the rental rate on capital and the current and
expected path of wages. As explained below, if the firm can renegotiate the wage, it
bargains with its workforce over a new contract. If it is not renegotiating, it takes
as given the wage at the previous period’s level, as well as the likelihood it will be
renegotiating in the future. The FOCs of their problem are:
(kpt (i)) rt = ϕ
p yt(i)
kpt (i)
= ϕp
yt
kpt
(1.19)
(vpt (i)) κx
p
t (i) = EtΛt,t+1
[
(1− ϕp) yt+1(i)
npt+1(i)
− (1 + θRt)wpt+1(i)−
κ
2
[xpt+1(i)]
2 + (1− σp)κxpt+1(i)
]
(1.20)
Private wage determination
For the private firm i, V F
npt
(i) is the expected value of the marginal job, given by:
V Fnpt (i) = (1− ϕ
p)
ypt (i)
npt (i)
− (1 + θRt)wpt (i)−
κ
2
[xpt (i)]
2 + (1− σp)κxpt (i) (1.21)
and V H
npt
is the expected marginal value for the household of having an additional
member employed in the private firm:
V Hnpt (i) = λ
c
t(1− τn)wpt (i)− Uu,t + λnpt (1− σp − ppt ) (1.22)
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The private wage is determined as the result of Nash bargaining between workers
and firms. However, every period, each firm only has a probability λ of renegotiating
with their workers. This process implies that it is not necessary to keep track of
individual firms’ wage histories, which makes aggregation simpler. Due to constant
returns, all workers are the same at the margin, so all workers employed at the firm
receive the same negotiated wage. When firms are not allowed to renegotiate the
wage, all existing and newly hired workers employed at the firm receive the wage
paid on the previous period. The problem then is to maximize the weighted sum of
the surpluses, taking into account that the firm may not be able to renegotiate the
wage:
max
(wpt )
∗
{
(1− ϑ) lnV Hnpt + ϑ lnV
F
npt
}
s.t. wpt =
(w
p
t )
∗ with probability 1− λ
wpt−1 with probability λ
(1.23)
The solution to the maximization gives a first order forward looking difference
equation for the contract wage:
∆t(w
p
t )
∗ =
(1− ϑ)
Γ
[
(1− ϕp)y
p
t
npt
− κ
2
[xpt ]
2 + (1− σp)κxpt
]
+
ϑ
Γλct(1− τn)
[Uu,t − λnpt (1− σp − ppt )] + λ(1− σp)∆t+1(wpt+1)∗ (1.24)
where Γ = ϑ + (1 − ϑ)(1 + θRt) and ∆t = Et
∑∞
s=0[(1 − σpλβ]sΛt,t+s captures the
worker’s cumulative discount factor, reflecting the uncertain duration of his tenure
on the firm.2
Finally, the aggregate wage wpt can be expressed simply as:
wpt = (1− λ)(wpt )∗ + λwpt−1 (1.25)
2A more detailed explanation can be found in Gertler and Trigari (2009).
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Government
The public good is produced with labor. The cost of vacancies is subtracted from
production as in Gomes (2014),
gt = (n
g
t )
1−ϕg − κvgt (1.26)
Government income consists on the revenue from the taxes levied to the households,
at fixed tax rates. The government uses an internationally traded bond bt with return
Rt to finance its deficit. The return Rt is determined exogenously as
Rt = R¯ ∗ Rt (1.27)
where Rt follows an AR(1) process with persistence ρR and standard deviation σR.
Government spending includes the public wage bill, unemployment benefits and the
lump-sum transfers to the households Tt. The government budget constraint is:
wgtn
g
t + but + Tt = τ
cct + τ
n(wgtn
g
t + w
p
tn
p
t ) + τ
k(rt − δ)kt + deft (1.28)
where deft is the government deficit,
deft = (1 +Rt)Bt+1 −Bt (1.29)
To ensure determinacy of equilibrium and a non-explosive path of debt, I assume
a debt-targeting rule of the form:
Tt = T¯ exp{ν(Bt − B¯)} (1.30)
where B¯ is the steady state value of debt.
Public vacancies and wages evolve according to rules. Public vacancies follow a
simple autoregressive rule, but including an additional term to allow for interactions
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with the private sector:
vgt+1 = v¯g + ρvg(v
g
t − v¯g) + ρvp(vpt − v¯p) + vgt (1.31)
where v¯g and v¯p are the steady state value of public and private vacancies, respec-
tively. Public wages also follow an autoregressive rule with an interaction term with
the private sector, but are in turn affected by the interest payments made by the
government, defined as ipt = RtBt. This extra term reflects the pressures of public
unions, which are able to extract higher wages when they perceive that the govern-
ment budget constraint is looser, that is, when interest payments go down:
wgt+1 = w¯g + ρwg(w
g
t − w¯g) + ρwp(wpt − w¯p)− ρip(ipt − i¯p) (1.32)
where variables with bars represent steady state values.
Closing the model and functional forms
The aggregate resources constraint is given by
yt = ct + it +
κ
2
(xpt )
2npt (1.33)
The utility function for the households takes the following form:
u(ct, gt) + v(ut) =
1
γ
ln(cγt + ζg
γ
t ) + χut (1.34)
The model features two exogenous disturbances: the shocks to productivity at and to
the return to the internationally traded bond Rt. The shock to Rt would be calibrated
to replicate the decrease of the risk premium faced by the peripheral economies of
the Euro Area described on the introductory section.
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1.3 Calibration
The model is calibrated so its steady state matches some key statistics from the sec-
ond half of the 1990s in the Spanish economy. This period represents an intermediate
state between the period of economic crisis at the beginning of the decade and the
introduction of the common currency in 1999. The calibration is detailed in table
1.4 in the Appendix.
Time is in years. The steady state value of unemployment (u) and of public
employment out of total employment (ng) are set to match observed values. The
total separation rate (σ) is taken from Hobijn and Sahin (2009) and then computed
for each sector. The matching elasticities (ηg and ηp) are taken from Gomes (2014).
For the tax rates (τc, τk and τn) I use the average implicit tax rate for the period,
computed by Eurostat. The depreciation rate (δ), the discount factor (β), the capital
share in the production function (ϕp) and the adjustment cost of capital (ω) are taken
from the literature. The exponent of the public good in the production function (ϕpg)
is calibrated from the average public investment to output ratio, as in Baxter and
King (1993). The productivity shock (a) is normalized to 1. The vacancy cost per
filled job (κ/wp) is taken from Gal´ı (2011). This ratio is used together with the
private wage obtained from the firm’s FOC for private vacancies to isolate κ.
The public wage premium (wg/wp), the public spending ratio (g/y), the debt-
to-GDP ratio (b/y), the debt interest rate (R), the replacement rate (b/wp) and the
working capital-to-GDP ratio are set to match observed values, and used to obtain
the public wage (wg), public good production (g), public debt (B), unemployment
benefits (b) and the proportion of private wages paid in advance (θ). Then, the labor
elasticity in the public production function (ϕg) can be obtained from the public
good production function. The workers’ bargaining power (ϑ) can be extracted from
the private wage determination function. Finally, the reaction of the public wage rule
to changes to interest payments (ρip) is taken from the regression of the introductory
section.
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1.4 Main results
In this section I present the effects on the model economy of the decrease in financing
costs occurred during the process of adoption of the Euro in Spain. This decrease
is simulated with a shock to the interest rate paid by the government and used by
the firms to finance their working capital. For reference, figures 1.2 and 1.3 in the
Appendix present the impulse responses of the economy to a productivity shock and
to a negative international interest rate shock, respectively.
When the interest rate shock hits, the first direct effect is the reduction in interest
payments. Unions take advantage of this reduction to push for higher public wages,
as can be seen in equation 1.32. Then, the rise of public wages affect private wages
through three different mechanisms. First, a higher public wages affects the outside
option of the private worker during wage bargaining. The value of unemployment
rises for the unemployed worker, because they discount the possibility of obtaining a
(now more lucrative) public job in the future, so firms must increase private wages.
Second, as we will see below, an interest rate shock decreases capital accumulation
on impact. With less capital in the economy, the workers are less productive and the
firms reduce the private wage. Finally, higher public wages lure more people into
looking for jobs in the public sector, producing more matches and more employment
in the private sector and so increasing the production of public good. As the public
good increases the productivity of the firm, each worker is now more valuable for the
firm and private wages go up. The net effect of these three effects, two positive and
one negative, is an increase of private wages following the interest rate shock.
On the other hand, the presence of working capital creates and additional mech-
anism of transmission from interest rates to private wages. When the interest shock
hits, firms can finance their intra-period loan more cheaply, reducing the cost of
their wage bill and, as can be seen in equation 1.21, the value of a job for the firms
rises, therefore increasing private wages. Therefore, to study the public wage chan-
nel is necessary to shut down this mechanism, simply by setting θ = 0, so that no
intra-period loans are taken.
With working capital, the relative accumulated response of private wages to public
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wages for the first five periods, that is, the ratio between the accumulated response of
public and private wages, is of 1.2866. Without working capital, just setting θ = 0,
the elasticity falls to 0.0955, implying that around 7.4% of the total effect registered
on the benchmark economy is due to the public wage channel.
Using the same data of table 1.1, I can therefore compute the effect of the in-
crease of public wages on private wages. During the 1999-2007 period, public wages
increased at an annual rate of a 4.4%, which would produce an increase in private
wages of a 0.420%. As private wages increased during that same period at an annual
rate of a 2.7%, then the model estimates that a 15.57% of the total increase was a
consequence of the lower interest rates via the public wage channel.
As a counter factual, according to the simulation, if public wages had increased
at the same annual rate than private wages (2.7%), the annual increase of private
wages would have been a 2.44%, due to the reduced pull effect of public wages. If
public wages would have been frozen during the period, then the increase of private
wages would have been just a 2.28%, a reduction of almost 0.5 percentage points.
For comparison, the annual growth rate of private wages from 2008 to 2013 was a
2.55%, even with the country involved in a process of internal devaluation.
As commented before, we can also observe that the negative shock to the interest
rates is pro cyclical: as the interest rate goes down, so does consumption and pro-
duction, whereas unemployment goes up. In the standard literature, interest rates
shocks are countercyclical, as the lower interest rates make investment cheaper and
allow for increased capital accumulation. The difference is that in this model only the
government holds bonds, to isolate the public wage channel. Then, the decrease in
the interest rate pushes up public wages, as we have seen, which moves unemployed
works to search with more intensity in the public sector. The proportion of people
looking for jobs in the public sector goes up and, correspondingly, the proportion
of people looking for jobs in the private sector goes down. With less unemployed
workers looking for jobs, the private sector reduces the number of vacancies it offers,
decreasing the probability of a given vacancy being filled. These two effects push
unemployment up: there are more people “queuing” for public jobs and less total
vacancies in the economy, because public vacancies do not move. The lower number
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of private vacancies reduces private employment, which in turn slows production and
consumption.
1.5 Sensitivity
As I discussed on the previous section, the rise on public wages affect private wages
through three channels: first, altering the outside option of workers while bargaining
for wages; second, producing a resources redistribution that decreases capital and
production, pushing private wages down; and, finally, making public employment go
up and so increasing the production of public good. More public good means more
productivity per private worker, so that the expected value of an extra job for the
firm goes up and private wages rise.
In the benchmark calibration I have assumed a value for the output elasticity of
the public capital of 0.1. By setting ϕpg = 0, the public capital becomes unproductive
and we can observe the importance of the third channel. With ϕpg = 0, the ratio
between the accumulated response of public and private wages decreases to 0.0953,
so this channel accounts for about 0.19% of the total effect. In this version of the
model, the simulation estimates that a 15.54% of the total increase in private wages
from 1999-2007 was a consequence of the public wage channel.
Similarly, the presence of adjustment costs in capital helps enhance the effect of
public wages on private wages by affecting the second channel, the decrease of capital.
With adjustment costs, the decrease in capital is smaller than with no adjustment
costs and, therefore, the productivity of the private worker does not fall as much,
helping keep their wages up. If I set ω = 0, so as to eliminate adjustment costs,
the ratio between the accumulated response of public and private wages decreases to
0.0822; a reduction of about a 13.99% in the total effect. Without adjustment costs,
the proportion of private wage increase consequence of the increase on public wages
on the period of interest falls to a 13.39 per cent.
Another element of the model affects the outside option of the unemployed work-
ers and hence the first channel: unemployment benefits. Reducing unemployment
benefits by half, so that the replacement rate is around that of the United States,
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wg ,wp % of benchmark
Benchmark 0.0955 −
Unproductive kg 0.0953 0.19%
No k adjustment cost 0.0822 13.99%
Reduced unemployment benefits 0.0779 18.45%
Table 1.2: Results of the sensibility exercises.
makes the accumulated response of public and private wages fall to 0.0779, a re-
duction of 18.45% of the benchmark. The simulation with reduced unemployment
benefits estimates that 12.69% of the total increase in private wages during the 99-07
period was consequence of the public wage channel.
Finally, the size of the interest rate shock, that is, changes to Rt , have no effect on
the ratio between the accumulated response of public and private wages. Whereas
the size of the shock affects the size of the response of public wages, the change on
private wages is proportional to that of public wages, so the ratio stays the same.
1.6 Validation
A common approach in the literature for evaluating the fit of the model is to com-
pare the theoretical second moments of the model to those observed in the data.
Table 1.3 reports standard deviations relative to output and contemporaneous cross-
correlations for the model’s simulated series under a TFP shock and for the data. The
data series for the real variables are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 90
and constructed by taking logs and filtering the raw data using the Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) filter. Data is yearly for the 1970-2008 period and the model is recalibrated for
that time period.
In general, the model does a good job replicating the relations between the series
but not their intensity. For example, the model replicates the higher variability of
investment with respect to consumption, but both simulated variabilities are low
with respect to the variabilities observed in the data. In terms of employment,
the model generates relative standard deviations which are far from those in the
18
SD relative to output c i n np ng wp wg
Data: Spain 1970-2008 1.03 2.81 1.46 1.65 0.98 1.16 1.17
Model simulation 0.75 1.86 0.10 0.10 0.26 0.86 1.82
Cross-correlations (n, np) (n, ng) (np, ng) (np, wp) (ng, wg) (wp, wg)
Data: Spain 1970-2008 0.99 0.31 0.25 -0.09 -0.18 0.46
Model simulation 0.93 0.57 0.23 0.05 -0.67 -0.22
Table 1.3: Standard deviations (relative to output) and cross-correlations of Spanish
data and model-generated series.
data. This problem is common on search and matching models, where the Nash
bargaining process tends to induce too much volatility in wages which, in turn,
dampens the cyclical movement in firms incentives to hire. In fact, the introduction
of wage stickiness as in Gertler and Trigari (2009) was intended to be a remedy to
the low volatility of vacancies and employment. However, to replicate the level of
employment volatility observed in the data it would be necessary to introduce in the
model an unrealistic level of wage stickiness, giving the yearly nature of the data. On
wages, the model replicates well the volatility of wages on average, but the variability
of private wages is too low and that of public wages too high.
On the other hand, the model does a remarkable job in replicating the correlation
between the different labor market series. For employment, the model replicates the
very close relation between private employment and total employment, the procycli-
cality of public employment and the small but positive relation between private and
public employment. All these relations are standard in the empirical literature for
OECD countries. The model also captures the lack of correlation between wages and
employment on the private sector. In the public sector, the model also replicates the
negative correlation between wages and employment of the data, albeit with higher
intensity, simply reflecting the high wage stickiness of public wages in the model.
Finally, the model misses the correlation between private and public wages for this
calibration and with only a TFP shock as the main driver of the variations. The
explanation can be found in the construction of the public wage rule, equation 1.32:
following a TFP shock that makes the private wage jump, the public wage only
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increases gradually, following the leadership of the private wage through ρwp , but
limited by the stickiness that ρwg imposes. The model, then, is better prepared to
replicate the nature of the relation between public and private wages when public
wage leadership plays a bigger role, as was the case following the introduction of the
Euro in Spain.
1.7 The effect of the post-crisis public wage cuts
As we have seen in previous sections, public wages played a significant role in the loss
of competitiveness experienced by some Eurozone countries prior to the current crisis.
In the aftermath of the crisis, public wages have kept a central role, as European
authorities raced to cut spending, reduce debt and improve competitiveness.
These efforts translated in pay cuts or freezes for public employees all around
Europe, but specially in the countries affected the most by the crisis or under aus-
terity programs. For example, the Spanish government introduced a 5% cut in civil
servants’ wages in 2010 and a freeze of their pay in 2011 as part of the program
to reduce expenditure by 15,000e million during those two years. Similarly, the
emergency package introduced by the Italian government during the spring of 2010
included a three year public sector wage freeze and cuts of 5% and 10% for those
with annual incomes over 90,000e and 150,000e, respectively. In Portugal, the gov-
ernment announced in 2010 a freeze of the wages of civil servants and employees in
public companies as part of the effort to save up to 3,000e million. Finally, the case
of Greece was particularly intense: after receiving a loan from the IMF and the EU,
the government introduced a cut in public sector wages, a 30% cut in special bonuses,
a reduction in overtime pay and the suspension of recruitment of new workers. It is
estimated that cuts in wages and bonuses will result in a de facto loss of income for
public sector workers of between 12 to 20%.3
What are the effects of a public wage cut in the public finances and the econ-
omy? In the model developed in previous sections, this event can be modeled as
3Source: European Federation of Public Service Unions.
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a shock to w¯g in equation 1.32. On top of that, to better reflect the state of the
economies in which these cuts have been implemented, it is necessary to change the
value of λ, the parameter governing private wage stickiness. Private wages in the
southern economies of the Euro have shown strong nominal downward rigidity since
the beginning of the crisis, despite the sharp contraction in aggregate demand and
the withdrawal of external credit.4 Taking into account this phenomenon is key to
analyze the effects on output and public finances, given that debt reduction was the
main motivation for the public wage cuts. I will set λ = 0.8, implying that the
average contract duration is 5 years.
The effects of such a shock can be seen in figure 1.4 in the Appendix. Private
wages go down following the public wage cut, but not much: after 5 years, the
accumulated decrease of private wages is just a 0.158 per cent. This result is an
obvious consequence of the existence of downward wage stickiness, which makes it
very difficult to try to correct the previous loss of competitiveness through public
wage cuts only.
Of course, the main goal of the public wage cuts was not directly to address
the loss of competitiveness, but the deterioration of the public finances. In the
simulation, public spending does go down, compounding the decrease in public wages
with the decrease in public employment, as less people look for public jobs. In total,
public spending is reduced from 41.82% of GDP before the public wage cut to 38.66%
of GDP after 5 years, a contraction of a 7.56 per cent. However, it is interesting to
note that public income also goes down, as the reduction in both public and private
wages shrinks the tax base of the labor tax. In this case, public income decreases
from 38.06% of GDP after the cut to 37.24%, a reduction of a 2.16 per cent. In the
simulation, public deficit moves from a 3.76% of GDP before the public wage cuts
to 1.41% of GDP after 5 years. The tax cut, therefore, is not enough to move the
country into superavit and reduce their debt levels.
These results, however must be taken with caution. As can be seen in figure 1.4
in the Appendix, the shock is procyclical, pushing private production, consumption
and investment up and unemployment down. The mechanism is similar as with
4See, for example, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2013).
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the case of the interest rate shock: lower public wages move unemployed workers
to search with more intensity in the private sector. With more unemployed workers
looking for jobs, the private sector increases the number of vacancies it offers, pushing
private employment up, which in turn accelerates production and consumption. The
problem is that the model does not fully considers the depressed state of the economy,
because of the crisis initiated in 2007, when austerity measures were introduced.
Consequently, the private sector may not be in position to accommodate the new
influx of unemployment workers looking for jobs due to lower public wages, which
could increase unemployment and hurt public income. A proper assessment of the
public wage cuts is left for future work.
1.8 Conclusions
This paper provided an estimation of the effect of increases in public wages on private
wages. More specifically, this question was studied in the context of the Spanish
economy following the introduction of the common currency. The introduction of
the Euro was accompanied a decrease in the cost of financing, through a reduction
of the interest rate premium, that relaxed the budget constraint of the government.
This slack translated into strong increases on public wages, through the pressures of
public unions, that in turn pushed private wages up.
For this simulation exercise, I used a DGSE model with search and matching
frictions, two sectors and a modified public wage rule to account for union pressures.
When the interest rate shock hits, interest payments go down. Unions take advantage
of this reduction to push for higher public wages, which also pushes the value of being
unemployed up, because a public job works as an outside option when bargaining
the private wage, and that outside option is now more valuable. Furthermore, the
increase in private wages produces a resources redistribution that decreases capital
and production, pushing private wages down. Also, higher public wages make public
employment go up and increase the production of public good. More public good
means more productivity per private worker, so that the expected value of an extra
job for the firm goes up and private wages rise. The net effect is an increase in
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private wages.
These results offer an important policy lesson for the countries that either joined
the EMU in recent years or are planning on doing so, and also for non-core members
moving forward. As we have seen, the decrease on interest rates associated with the
introduction of the Euro can put an upward pressure on wages, creating a differential
with the countries at the core of the Eurozone. These differentials are very difficult to
correct within a monetary union from the periphery, as demonstrated by the current
austerity programs ongoing in the periphery of the Eurozone, without the possibility
of using monetary policy and with a constrained fiscal policy. These countries are
therefore advised to contain the growth of public wages in order to avoid or mitigate
future imbalances.
As an additional exercise, I also studied the effect of the public wage cuts observed
in various countries during the current Eurozone crisis. I increased the parameter
governing wage stickiness to induce downward wage rigidity in the model, so as to
replicate the conditions of the southern economies of the Eurozone during this par-
ticular time. When a public wage cut is simulated in this economy, public spending
is effectively reduced. However, labor tax income also falls, limiting the impact of
the measure on the fiscal position of the country.
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A Calibration
Param. Value Definition Source or target
σg 0.0329 Separation rate, public sector Hobijn and Sahin (2007)
σp 0.0659 Separation rate, private sector Hobijn and Sahin (2007)
ηg 0.2 Matching elasticity, public sector Gomes (2012)
ηp 0.5 Matching elasticity, private sector Gomes (2012)
µg 0.1285 Matching efficiency, public sector Gomes (2012)
µp 0.5548 Matching efficiency, private sector Gomes (2012)
κ/wp 0.45 Vacancy cost to private wage ratio Gali (2011)
ϕg 0.1318 Capital share, public production From (1.26)
ϕp 0.36 Capital share, private production Literature
ϕpg 0.0333 Public good share, private production From public inv. to GDP ratio
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate Literature
ω 5.5 Adjustment cost of capital Literature
a 1 Productivity shock Normalization
θ 0.3252 Private wages paid in advance From working cap. to GDP ratio
u 0.14 Unemployment rate OECD
ng 0.13 Public employment OECD
np 0.63 Private employment OECD
R 0.06 International interest rate Eurostat
wg/wp 1.17 Public wage premium OECD
g/y 0.3 Public spending to GDP ratio OECD
B/y 0.626 Public debt to GDP ratio OECD
β 0.99 Discount rate Literature
γ 1 Elasticity of substitution, public-private goods Literature
ζ 0.1 Public good coefficient on utility Gomes (2012)
χ 0.46 Unemployment coefficient on utility Gomes (2012)
ν 2 Sensibility of transfer to public debt Bermperoglou et al. (2015)
ϑ 0.0817 Workers bargaining power From (1.24)
b/wp 0.35 Replacement rate ILO
τc 0.151 Tax rate on consumption Eurostat
τk 0.293 Tax rate on capital Eurostat
τn 0.305 Tax rate on labor Eurostat
ρa 0.9 Autocorrelation of productivity shock Literature
σa 0.08 Variability of productivity shock Literature
ρip 0.166 Elasticity of interest payments on public wage Regression
ρwg 0.925 Autocorrelation of public wage rule Regression
Table 1.4: Parameters and steady state values.
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Figure 1.2: Impulse responses to a productivity shock
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Figure 1.3: Impulse responses to an interest rate shock
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Figure 1.4: Impulse responses to a 5% public wage cut
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Chapter 2
Regional decentralization and
fiscal policy effects - international
and intranational evidence
Joint with Reinhard Ellwanger
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between government structure and the effec-
tiveness of fiscal policy. The effects of fiscal policy on economic outcomes is highly
important for policy makers and academics alike; also, it is a striking feature that
countries vary substantially in their organization of taxing and spending compe-
tences between different levels of government. We refer to the latter as the degree of
“decentralization” and provide evidence that more decentralized countries, in other
words, countries in which the regional governments have more fiscal competences,
are associated with more effective fiscal policies.
The organization of taxing and spending competences between different levels
of government has been shown to be important for government deficit reduction
(Schaltegger and Feld 2009), the size of the government (Feld, Kirchga¨ssner, and
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Schaltegger 2004), economic growth (Thießen 2003) and fiscal discipline (Rodden
2002). At the same time, the academic literature on the determinants and transmis-
sion mechanisms of fiscal policy is still inconclusive (see e.g. Perotti 2007; Corsetti,
Meier, and Mu¨ller 2012). While determinants of fiscal policy effectiveness such as
the level of development, exchange rate regime, openness to trade and public in-
debtedness have been addressed in the literature before (see e.g. Ilzetzki, Mendoza,
and Ve´gh 2013) this paper is to our best knowledge the first study to investigate
the relationship between decentralization and fiscal policy effectiveness in terms of
multipliers.
Using two distinct empirical approaches we show that fiscal decentralization is
associated positively with the effectiveness of fiscal policy for stimulating economic
growth. The first approach exploits cross country variation in the degree of relative
spending competences between central and regional governments. In none of the var-
ious European countries considered in our study, government spending is completely
carried out by the central government, and, in some countries, regional governments
are responsible for more than half of the total government spending. In a first step,
we construct a “decentralization index” based on the relative spending of the regional
governments and classify countries accordingly. We then estimate the response of
GDP to unexpected government spending shocks using the SVAR approach intro-
duced by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for each country separately. The results
indicate that a higher degree of decentralization in terms of government spending
and taxation revenue is, on average, associated with a larger impact of shocks to these
elements on economic growth. In particular, the corresponding fiscal multipliers tend
to be larger in countries that are more decentralized. While the empirical approach
is similar to studies including cross country evidence such as Corsetti, Meier, and
Mu¨ller (2012) or Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Ve´gh (2013), we acknowledge two potential
shortcomings of our approach. First, the countries and their corresponding regions
used in our study vary importantly in size of their regional and central governments,
which makes the comparison of the different type of governments across countries
difficult. Second, our SVAR approach is based on total government spending, i.e.
the sum of central and regional government spending; thus it does not identify if
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at any point in time, the government spending shocks resulted from the regional or
central government.
We address these shortcomings by contrasting our results with a case study from
Spain, which is one of the few countries in our sample displaying significant time
variation in the degree of decentralization. Spain offers a unique example of fiscal
decentralization due to historical reasons. The dictatorship that ruled the country
for almost forty years until 1975 imposed a very centralized fiscal system on a country
with very heterogeneous regions. An important pillar of the Spanish transition to
democracy involved transferring fiscal autonomy to the regions. We exploit this time
variation as well as the fact that the decentralization process was not implemented
in all regions at the same time. We argue that the timing of the implementations
was a reaction to political rather than economic forces, therefore yielding an iden-
tification for the effects of decentralization on economic growth. The exact timing
and sizes of these shocks are pinpointed via the “narrative approach” to fiscal policy
evaluation (Romer and Romer 2010). We use data on fiscal spending and revenues
at the regional level, which also allows for a more thorough decomposition of fiscal
policy instruments into three series: direct taxation income, indirect taxation income
and spending. Our results provide evidence for significant positive effects of decen-
tralization on regional GDP growth, with the size of the effect being particularly
large for the direct taxation series. Contrary to the cases of the decentralization of
spending or indirect taxation, the regional governments were allowed to modify im-
portant legislative aspects concerning direct taxation. Hence the increased decision
power of the regions to employ fiscal instruments in general, and direct taxation in
particular, leads to the positive impact of fiscal decentralization on regional output
growth documented in this paper.
Our results are consistent with standard theories of fiscal federalism (Oates et al.
1972; Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini 2001) postulating that local governments
have an informational advantage when implementing fiscal policy. While central
governments will tend to make rather homogeneous allocations, regional fiscal policy
can be tailored to the preferences of the constituency and will therefore be more
effective, if there is a large degree of heterogeneity in preferences and / or economic
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conditions within a single country. The case study also shows that when it comes
to fiscal decentralization, the “how” is important relative to the “how much”: de-
centralization of direct taxation, which can be designed and implemented relatively
freely by the regions, seems to be more effective than the decentralization of other
fiscal instruments such as indirect taxation and spending.
The remainder of this paper is structured as followed: section 2 presents the
cross country evidence, starting with a discussion of the decentralization measure,
followed by the empirical implementations and results; section 3 presents evidence
from Spain, while section 4 concludes.
2.2 International evidence
2.2.1 Measuring decentralization
This section investigates the cross-country relationship between decentralization and
fiscal policy effectiveness in the form of government spending and revenue multi-
plier. Measures of decentralization typically fall in one of the two categories: the
first focuses on fiscal policy, and the relation between expenditures and allocations,
while the second focuses on the nature of the intergovernmental relations and their
regulation (see e.g the survey Sharma (2006)). We draw on the former, since it
provides a clearer quantitative measure and the focus of this study is fiscal policy.
Indeed, Sharma (2006) concludes that when it comes to the measurement of fiscal
decentralization, the share of sub-national expenditures and revenues is considered
to be the best indicator. Following this idea, the measure of decentralization we con-
sider in the subsequent analysis is subnational (regional) spending as a percentage
of total public spending of a respective country. Since we are interested in the effect
of direct government spending, we exclude transfers (“social protection”) from both
the regional and the total government spending. However, as shown below, alter-
native decentralization measures based on total spending (i.e. including transfers)
and relative tax rather than spending competences lead to a similar classification of
“centralized” and “decentralized” countries.
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One caveat to our approach to measuring decentralization is that it does not ac-
count for potentially delegated spending, i.e. regional spending that was not carried
out in an autonomous manner but rather as part of a central government’s mandate.
However, similar decentralization measures are common in the literature and a good
proxy for decentralization (Davoodi and Zou (1998), Oates (1985) or Mello (2001)).
Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) suggest that the measure should perform reasonably well for
developed countries, like the ones studied in this exercise.
We use yearly data from 1996 to 2011 on regional central government spending.
Our decentralization index, presented in figure 2.1, is then computed as the average
regional government spending net of transfers over the total government spending
net of transfers:1
Di =
1
T
T∑
t
government spending by non-central governmentit
total government spendingit
, (2.1)
where Di is the value of the index for country i.
The average of the decentralization measure for the period considered is about
45%, implying that, on average, less than half of total non-transfer spending is carried
out at the sub-national level. However, there is a high degree of variability between
the extremes of the index, with values as low as 8% for Greece and as high as 82%
for Switzerland. In the medium of the spectrum, between 45% and 60%, there is a
group of five countries, from Germany to Italy, that are very close in terms of the
index.
As shown in figure 2.13 in Appendix C, the measure of decentralization is very
similar to the one computed including social spending. Similarly reassuring is that
the decentralization index based on tax income, (figure 2.14 in Appendix C), suggests
an almost identical grouping of the countries. The main difference is that Denmark
appears to be the most decentralized country. Based on these observations, we group
1The particular selection of the countries is based on data availability (excluding for example
Eastern European countries) and variation in decentralization. Countries such as Belgium and
Netherlands, for example, have a decentralization index very close to the median and where hence
excluded.
33
010
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Figure 2.1: Decentralization Index: Regional share of spending net of transfers.
Averages along with highest and lowest observation. Calculation based on yearly
data 1996 - 2011.
countries into decentralized countries (Group 1: Switzerland, Spain and Denmark),
centralized countries (Group 3: UK, Greece, Portugal and France), and a range of
medium centralized countries (Group 2: Sweden, Germany, Italy and Austria) for
our later analysis.
A potential caveat is that there might be important time variation in our index
that is “averaged away” through our computation of the index. In fact, due to data
availability, the data we use to construct the index starts in 1996, while the VAR
analysis is based on data starting from 1980. However, empirically we find the index
to be relatively stable over time. The graphs 2.1, 2.13 and 2.14 in Appendix C also
depict the maximum and the minimum observation for each country (indicated by
the end of the whiskers). The range appears relatively small, except in the case of
Spain. We will exploit this time variation on the second part of this study.
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Spending Cons. Spending Inv. Spending Revenues
Group 1 0.211 0.175 0.0361 0.410
(0.0595) (0.0571) (0.00722) (0.0975)
Group 2 0.262 0.233 0.0292 0.479
(0.0645) (0.0557) (0.00994) (0.0742)
Group 3 0.246 0.213 0.0339 0.389
(0.0263) (0.0254) (0.0116) (0.0817)
Table 2.1: Spending and Revenues over GDP by decentralization group. Spending
denotes the sum of government consumption and investment expenditure; Cons.
and Inv. Spending stand for consumption and investment spending, respectively.
Standard deviations in parenthesis. Quarterly observations, 1980-2007.
Decentralization and other determinants of fiscal multipliers
The government structure is not the only source of variability in the effect of gov-
ernment spending shocks. In order to identify effects that might arise through the
degree of decentralization, we would like the index not to covary systematically with
other determinants of government spending and taxation effectiveness. Indeed, the
extensive literature on fiscal multipliers has identified several factors that can deter-
mine the size of fiscal multipliers. For example, Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Ve´gh (2013)
show that, for a large set of countries, openness to trade, exchange rate flexibility
and outstanding government debt influence the size of multipliers. Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) findings suggest that, for a given country, multipliers depend
on the current state of the economy. In particular, multipliers appear to be signif-
icantly larger in recessions than in expansions. Corsetti, Meier, and Mu¨ller (2012)
find fiscal multipliers to be larger during financial crisis and fixed exchange rate
regimes. Although the evidence concerning the determinants of fiscal multipliers is
far from conclusive,2 we discuss below how the specific countries and groups might
be affected differently by these various factors.
Table 2.1 displays the average government spending, its disaggregated consump-
tion and investment components and revenues, divided by GDP, for the various
2In contrast to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), for example, Ramey and Zubairy (2014)
do not find evidence for elevated fiscal multipliers during economic slacks and the recent financial
crisis.
35
GDP growth (pc) (X+IM)/GDP Population Gross debt/GDP (pct.)
Group 1 1.847 2.228 17.33 48.59
(1.788) (0.532) (16.10) (13.93)
Group 2 1.853 2.342 38.39 71.05
(1.430) (0.614) (31.38) (21.26)
Group 3 2.082 1.843 34.01 53.91
(2.031) (0.379) (23.86) (21.00)
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for additional determinants of fiscal multipliers by
decentralization group, yearly observations 1980-2007. Population is in million.
Standard deviation in parenthesis. Source: International Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook Database and eLibrary.
groups.3 Government spending, in particular consumption, appears to be somewhat
smaller in decentralized countries (Group 1), but as seen in figure figure 2.15 in Ap-
pendix C, this relationship is rather weak. On the other hand, the average share of
revenues tend to be larger in medium decentralized countries (Group 2).4 Also, there
does not seem to be a systematic relationship between decentralization and the level
of government debt. The average government debt-to-GDP ratio is around 50% for
both centralized and decentralized countries, but larger for the medium group (table
2.2). As seen in figure 2.16 in Appendix C, this fact is mainly driven by the high
debt-to-GDP ratio in Italy. Moreover, the numbers presented in table 2.2 document
that the decentralized and centralized groups of countries appear to be quite sim-
ilar along the crucial dimensions of GDP growth (capturing boom vs. recessions),
debt-to-GDP ratio and the sum of imports and exports relative to GDP as a mea-
sure of openness.5 Only the medium group displays a considerably higher average
debt-to-GDP ratio, and also the highest openness indicator as measured by import
plus exports-to-GDP.6
Corsetti, Meier, and Mu¨ller (2012) provide definitions for fixed exchange rates
3Table 2.6 in Appendix C provides a more detailed overview over these variables by country.
4Note that table displays gross revenues (including transfers), which means that spending and
revenues do not necessarily have to be equal to imply a balanced budget.
5Table 2.7 in Appendix C provides a more detailed overview over these variables by country.
6To the extent that decentralization is associated with factors such as fiscal discipline, as argued
by Rodden (2002), for example, the effect from decentralization to fiscal multipliers might be indirect
but can still be traced back to the former.
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Group Currency Peg Financial Crisis
Denmark decentralized 1980 - 2007 1987 - 1992
Spain decentralized 1984 - 2007 1984 - 1985
Austria medium 1980 - 2007 -
Italy medium 1983 - 1991, 1998 - 2007 1990 - 1991
Sweden medium 1980 - 1992 1991 - 1994
France centralized 1982 - 2007 1994 - 1995
Portugal centralized 1990 - 2007 -
UK centralized - -
Table 2.3: Overview of exchange rate characteristics and financial crisis periods
according to Corsetti, Meier, and Mu¨ller (2012) for available countries.
regimes and financial crisis episodes for most countries in our sample.7 Table 2.3
shows that most countries, with the exception of UK, had a pegged exchange rate
for most of the sample period. Financial crisis, however, seemed to be more frequent
in the decentralized countries. Taken together though, we find only little evidence for
major overlaps between decentralization and other determinants of fiscal multipliers
that might be driving our results.
2.2.2 Econometric framework and data description
Our cross-country analysis considers unexpected changes in government spending and
revenue in order to evaluate the impact of fiscal policy on output growth. Following
Fata´s and Mihov (2001) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) we employ Structural
VARs (SVAR) to quantify this impact. Their approaches have in common that
they exploit decision lags in fiscal policy-making, which allow the identification of
fiscal shocks. Since we are using quarterly data in our study, the assumption that
discretionary government purchases and revenues are not going to be made effectively
law and implemented within the same observation period as a GDP shock is likely
to be met; hence they can be predetermined with respect to the macroeconomic
variables.
Proceeding with the description of the reduced form model, for our baseline
7Not covered are Greece, Germany and Switzerland.
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specification, we consider the following vector
Xt = (gt, yt, rt)
′, (2.2)
where gt is the growth rate of real government consumption and investment spending,
yt is the growth rate of real GDP and rt is real government revenue growth.
8
The following reduced form model is then estimated individually for each country:
Xt = c0 +
k∑
i=1
φXt−i + et, (2.3)
where c0 is a constant and et ∼ WN(0,Σ) represent the reduced form error shocks.
In order to ensure comparability between the countries, we choose a lag length of
k = 5 in each estimation. This appears to be a reasonable compromise between
the four lags proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and the 6 lags employed by
Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
The data for government investment and consumption spending, revenues and
GDP for 11 European countries are obtained from Oxford Economics. The spending
and the GDP variables are already obtained in real terms, while we transform nom-
inal revenues using the GDP deflator.9 Growth rates are computed via log changes.
For all countries, we use data from 1985-2007, yielding T = 85 observations. Using
pre-2008 data ensures that our results are not affected by the financial crisis.
2.2.3 Identification of structural innovations
We assume that the reduced form errors are related to their structural counterparts
via the representation Aet = But, where ut ∼ (0, I) are the structural shocks. With-
out restrictions on the parameters in A and B the structural model is not identified.
Hence additional assumptions will be necessary to disentangle A and B from the
estimates of the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form errors. Our model is
8Ideally, the government revenue should be net of transfers. However, we take the gross series
as a proxy as we did not find consistent data regarding net transfers for all countries.
9The series not already seasonally adjusted were adjusted using the Census X-13 methodology.
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similar to the one of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005), who applied
this approach to estimate the effect of government spending and tax shocks for the
US and several other OECD countries. In particular, let the structural relationship
between the reduced form and the structural errors take the form 1 0 0α21 1 α23
0 α32 1

 e
g
t
eyt
ett
 =
 σ
2
g 0 β13
0 σ2y 0
β31 0 σ
2
t

 u
g
t
uyt
utt
 , (2.4)
where α21, α23 and α32 are, respectively, the value of the elasticities of output
relative to government spending and taxes, and the elasticity of taxes relative to out-
put. The parameter β13 captures the response of government spending to unexpected
(structural) shocks in revenue, while conversely, β31 presents the response of govern-
ment revenues to unexpected (structural) shocks in spending. Since the reduced
form variance-covariance matrix has six distinct elements, additional assumptions
are necessary to identify the parameters α21, α23, α32, β13 and β31. They are derived
from both exclusion restrictions and outside information. On a quarterly frequency,
fiscal policy is plausibly subject to decision lags; i.e., the time needed for fiscal policy
makers to respond to changes in output is at least one quarter. Then any remaining
correlation between the unpredicted components of government spending and output
is due to the impact of government spending on output. Similarly, α32, the output
elasticity of taxes, can then be obtained by regressing revenue on the tax base and the
corresponding estimate can be imposed directly in equation 2.4. One caveat is that
the tax multipliers obtained this way are quite sensitive to the particular estimate of
α32 (Caldara and Kamps 2012). However, for the countries considered in this study,
the values appear quite similar and close to 1, according to recent OECD estimates
(Price, Dang, and Guillemette 2014). This estimation is considerably lower than the
estimate of 1.85 obtained by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for the United States,
but close to the one of 0.95 obtained by Tenhofen, Wolff, and Heppke-Falk (2010)
for Germany. Moreover, since the main purpose of this study is to derive relative
values of fiscal multipliers across countries, and the elasticities appear indeed similar
between them, we expect the uncertainty regarding the output elasticity of taxes
39
not to influence our results significantly.10 Finally, we follow Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) in setting β13 = 0, which implies that spending decisions come before tax
decisions.
One caveat of our specification is that given that gt presents aggregate government
spending, we have insufficient information if, in each given point in time, spending
came from the central or local governments.11 Our VAR results therefore identify
the average effect of government spending on growth, without discriminating between
the regional and central government spending more directly.
2.2.4 Results
This section describes the estimation results of the model presented in the previous
section. We present the results in the following form. First, each countries’ output
cumulative response to a fiscal shock is standardized by dividing the cumulative GDP
response to fiscal shocks by the ratio of GDP relative to the respective fiscal variable
and the standard deviation of the fiscal shocks:
Dynamic Multiplier =
Output response
Initial Fiscal Shock
∗ (Average fiscal variable share of GDP).
Second, we present average results for the three groups of countries. Averages
are taken over the country specific multipliers in the respective group at each point
in time. This approach is similar to the one employed by Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and
Ve´gh (2013), who classify countries according to a certain characteristic and then
estimate fiscal multipliers separately for each group using panel VARs. Instead, our
averaging method does not restrict the dynamics for each country in the group to
be the same. We employ a bootstrap procedure, which is outlined in Appendix C in
more detail, in order to compute the corresponding confidence intervals.
10In fact, we performed robustness analysis using different values for α32, which changed the size
of the multipliers somewhat, but not the relative ordering.
11Having this info would allow us to more directly evaluate the relative effect of central and
regional government shocks, respectively. Unfortunately historical time series for quarterly series
of regional expenditure is not available for most countries.
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The effect of government spending shocks
Figure 2.2 depicts the multipliers for total government spending. The multiplier for
the most decentralized countries is about one on impact, and slightly increasing to a
value of around two after ten quarters. The multiplier for the centralized countries
is noticeably lower and around 0.5 on impact, and reaches its maximum of one
after about one year before declining afterward. In contrast, the multiplier for the
medium countries is only slightly positive on impact but indistinguishable from zero
thereafter. One explanation for this results is that the group of medium countries
also exhibits the highest average debt to GDP and openness measure, displayed in
table 2.2, both of which are associated with lower multipliers (Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and
Ve´gh 2013).
Disaggregated government spending
This subsection considers the effect of government consumption and government in-
vestment spending separately. Hemming, Kell, and Mahfouz (2002) note that fiscal
multipliers can vary across different policy instruments, so we expect to obtain ad-
ditional insights from the disaggregation of the different components of government
spending. The estimation follows the baseline model described above, where gt con-
tains either consumption or investment spending. Figure 2.3 depicts the multipliers
for government consumption spending only, with a pattern strikingly similar to the
aggregate spending multiplier. The only differences appear to be a dip in the mul-
tiplier for the centralized countries after 3 quarters, and a slightly larger long-run
response of output growth for the medium countries.
In contrast, the results for the government investment spending only, presented in
figure 2.4, indicate much larger multipliers, around two, for both the centralized and
decentralized countries. Here we notice little difference according to decentralization.
Moreover, the multiplier for the medium group turns negative after several quarters.
Obtaining negative estimates for the multipliers is not uncommon (Perotti 2005),
and can occur when distortionary taxes are imposed following debt financed spending
(Baxter and King 1993).
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative spending multipliers, average across country group. Point
estimates with 84% and 16% bootstrap percentiles.
The effect of government revenue shocks
Figure 2.5 displays the estimated revenue multipliers, which appear to be of a smaller
magnitude. On impact all multipliers are similar and around 0.5, but while the
multipliers for the decentralized and medium countries increase over time to a value
around 1, the multiplier for the centralized countries slowly declines.
Taken together, for all cases considered, the decentralized countries exhibit rel-
atively larger multipliers. Only in the case of government investment spending, the
group of centralized countries exhibits multipliers of a similar magnitude than the
decentralized countries. For government consumption spending and revenues, the
multipliers are substantially lower and appear to be less persistent.
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative government consumption multipliers, average across country
group. Point estimates with 84% and 16% bootstrap percentiles.
2.2.5 Robustness
This section discusses two robustness checks for the results presented in the previous
subsection. The first is based on the estimation of bivariate VARs that identify gov-
ernment spending and government revenue shocks separately; the second contrasts
our results from those reported in Dellas, Neusser, and Wa¨lti (2005), who provide
point estimates for multipliers for the majority of the countries in our sample.
Estimates based on bivariate VARs
This robustness check involves contrasting our results from a series of bivariate VARs
that identify government spending and government revenue shocks separately. An
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Figure 2.4: Cumulative government investment multipliers, average across country
group. Point estimates with 84% and 16% bootstrap percentiles.
advantage of using bivariate models is that the calculation of the cumulative multi-
pliers from the VAR system described below is not sensitive to the persistence of the
fiscal shocks, whereas for larger systems, this is generally not the case (Giordano et
al. 2007). We consider the vectors X1t , X
2
t , referring to the models with government
spending and with government revue, respectively,
X1t = (gt, yt)
′, X2t = (yt, rt)
′, (2.5)
and estimate the reduced form models with the same specification as the baseline
case. Similar to the baseline model, the identifying assumptions are
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Figure 2.5: Cumulative revenue multipliers, average across country group. The
multipliers describe the output response to a negative tax shock. Point estimates
with 84% and 16% bootstrap percentiles.
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in the case of the model including revenues, where α21 is imposed by the output
elasticity of revenues. As for the three variable VARs, we choose −α21 = 1 for all
countries.
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Figures 2.17, 2.18, 2.19 and 2.20 in Appendix C depicts the multipliers for to-
tal government spending, government revenues, and the disaggregated consumption
and investment multipliers respectively, showing almost identical patterns as for the
VARs with three variables.
Comparison with results from other cross-country studies
Our results regarding spending multipliers are supported by the estimates presented
in Dellas, Neusser, and Wa¨lti (2005), who investigate the effect economic openness
has on the size of fiscal multipliers. The authors’ estimates of government consump-
tion multipliers rely on a similar yet substantially larger SVAR system, that includes
inflation and interest rates, among others.
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Figure 2.6: Decentralization Index vs. cumulative government consumption spending
multipliers reported in Dellas, Neusser, and Wa¨lti (2005).
Figure 2.6 plots, for the countries available, the decentralization index against
the estimates obtained by Dellas, Neusser, and Wa¨lti (2005). Supportive of our find-
ings, there is a small, positive relationship between decentralization and government
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consumption multipliers on impact, that becomes substantial after 4 quarters.
2.3 Intranational evidence from Spain
2.3.1 The decentralization process of Spain (1975-2007)
As we have seen on the previous section, the regional decentralization of a country can
have a noticeable impact on the effectiveness of its fiscal policy. Allowing the regional
governments to carry out a larger share of the total public spending or collect a bigger
proportion of taxes appears to affect how the economy in general - and economic
growth, in particular - reacts with respect to shocks to the fiscal instruments. In
this section, we address some weaknesses of the cross-country approach; namely,
our inability to differentiate between central and regional government spending at
each point in time, and the potential difficulty to compare international regions
that differ vastly in its size.12 The countries studied on the previous section exhibit
a relatively stable regional configuration, as shown by the rather small variation
of their decentralization indexes, with one notable exception: Spain. It is exactly
this time variation that we exploit in this section in order to address the following
question: if decentralization affects fiscal policy, what are the effects from further
decentralizing the fiscal policy on economic growth?
Spain offers a unique example of fiscal decentralization due to historical reasons.
The dictatorship that ruled the country for almost forty years until 1975 imposed
a very centralized fiscal system on a very heterogeneous country. One of the main
pillars of the Spanish transition to democracy involved transferring autonomy to
the regions. The gradual and asymmetrical nature of the process can be naturally
exploited to test the effects of increasing the fiscal competence of the regional gov-
ernments.
The Spanish Constitution of 1978, on its Title VII, allowed for the concession of
12For example, Germany’s largest region Nordrhein-Westfalen is about three times larger than
Denmark in terms of population.
47
extensive prerogatives to the regional governments, called Comunidades Auto´nomas.13
The process was not immediate, however, to the point that it can still be considered
an open issue. Some regions with stronger regional identities moved quickly to ap-
prove their regional Constitutions (Estatutos de Autonomı´a) and started the transfer
of prerogatives right away while other regions lagged behind and only received these
prerogatives after nationwide agreements. The heterogeneity on the timeline and its
predominantly political nature offers a natural experiment on fiscal decentralization
that we exploit to measure its impact on economic growth.
The analysis of this section is based on the data of the Comunidades Auto´nomas’
Budget Series from the General Secretary for Local and Regional Coordination (Sec-
retar´ıa General de Coordinacio´n Local y Autono´mica). The database offers yearly
consolidated series of 9 income categories and 9 expenditure categories from 1984 to
2013 for the 17 main Spanish regions. As in the previous section, we will focus on
the 1984-2007 period, as the depth of the current economic crises complicates greatly
any analysis of the data from 2008 onwards.
Our analysis will focus on 3 series: direct taxation income, indirect taxation in-
come and spending. The last series is a composite of expenditure on public wages and
public consumption. The analysis of these series allows us to identify major transfers
of autonomy to the regional governments, its timing and its size as a percentage of
regional GDP. Combining the analysis of the series and a narrative approach, we were
able to identify five major episodes of fiscal decentralization, where a prerogative was
transferred to the regional governments.
Two important points characterize this analysis. First, even though in every
episode regional tax income or spending increases, these changes are rather inter-
preted as decentralization shocks than “classical” tax or spending shocks. We use
this interpretation because, in principle, the increase in regional spending and rev-
enue merely offsets the fiscal activity previously carried out by the central government
and does not necessarily have to lead to a change in total (local and central) gov-
ernment spending or taxes in the region. To the extent that it does change total
government spending or taxes, our analysis provides a measure for the joint effect
13A detailed report on the beginning of the process can be found in Molero (2001).
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of a (decentralization induced) change in actual spending or taxes and a change in
efficiency of spending and tax collection. In either case the results provide evidence
for the effects arising from decentralization through increased fiscal independence of
the regions. Second, we provide evidence that the timing of the implementation of
regional fiscal policy was largely exogenous to economic conditions in a particular
region (or Spain) and primarily politically motivated.14 This exogenous variation
reinforces our identification of the effects arising from decentralization shocks.15
2.3.2 Episodes of decentralization
Based on a narrative approach to identify discretionary policy measures, we observe
five major episodes in the decentralization process of Spain:
1. The decentralization of health services. This process spanned over 20 years, with
some regions, like Catalonia, gaining the prerogatives on health services as early
as 1981 whereas the majority of the regions finally gained the competence in
2001. On average, this transfer of competence resulted on a permanent increase
of regional spending of over 3% of regional GDP.
2. The decentralization of non-tertiary education. As with the previous case, re-
gions as Catalonia and the Basque Country started handling non-tertiary edu-
cation as early as 1980. This decentralization process concluded in 1999. The
result was an average permanent increase of regional spending of around 2.5%
of regional GDP.
3. First transfer of the Income Tax. In 1996, regions were allowed to keep up
to 15% of all the Income Tax collected on their territory. Five regions stood
out of this agreement: on one hand, Navarra and the Basque Country already
handled most of their own taxes; on the other hand, Andaluc´ıa, Extremadura
and Castilla-La Mancha argued that the cession broke the principle of regional
14See, for example, the analysis of Sua´rez-Pandiello (1999).
15One drawback of our approach (which is also the case for the cross-country section) is that we
cannot control for the anticipation of these effects.
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solidarity and was therefore unconstitutional. These regions appealed the law
to the Constitutional Court. The appeal was overturned and these regions
finally complied and started collecting their allotted share when the Income
Tax was transferred for the second time, as discussed below. On average, this
transfer created a permanent increase on direct taxation income of the regions
of around 1% of regional GDP.
4. Second transfer of the Income Tax. In 2001, the proportion of the Income Tax
collected on their territory that regions were allowed to keep raised up to 33 %.
This time, only Navarra and the Basque Country were not directly affected.
The size of the shock was similar to the first transfer of Income Tax.
5. Transfer of the Value Added Tax (VAT). Also in 2001, regions were allowed to
keep up to 35% of all the VAT collected on their territory. As before, Navarra
and the Basque Country were not directly affected, but neither were the Canary
Islands, which have a different indirect taxation regime. The transfer resulted
on a permanent increase of indirect taxation income of around 3.7% of regional
GDP.
The nature of these series allows us to use an empirical strategy similar to Romer
and Romer (2010). The authors introduce what has become known as the “nar-
rative approach” to identify fiscal policy shocks by analyzing a series of exogenous
tax changes based on historical records in the US.16 Similarly, we construct series of
exogenous decentralization changes, valued 0 for every t except where we have iden-
tified a decentralization change, in which case the series takes the value of the size of
the change in terms of % of regional GDP. In this case, the year of the shock will be
the year in which we observe the actual change in the series of the respective fiscal
measure, not the year in which the legislation was introduced. Further, we com-
bine the first two episodes into a single “Spending Decentralization” shocks series;
episodes three and four are combined into a single “Direct Taxation” shocks series,
16Subsequently these series are employed by the authors to quantify the effect of tax changes on
GDP growth.
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Figure 2.7: First difference of the spending, indirect taxation and direct taxation
series for Arago´n, measured as % of regional GDP, 1985-2007.
while the last episode defines “Indirect Taxation” shocks. We also define a “Decen-
tralization” shock series, created by combining all shocks. With this definition, we
aim at capturing the effect of the change when it is effectively introduced. Given
that our series on decentralization changes are the reflection of a political process, we
expect no systematic correlation between these changes and other determinants of
output growth. Evidence in favor of this hypothesis is presented in the next section.
We explain our approach to identifying decentralization shocks via the example of
the region of Arago´n. Figure 2.7 shows the first difference of the three aforementioned
series measured as percentage of regional GDP. It shows clearly the five episodes of
decentralization. The transfer of non-tertiary education appears as an increase on
spending of almost 2% of regional GDP in 1999, whereas the transfer of health
services is captured by the jump on spending of more than a 3% of regional GDP
during 2004. The increased cession of the Income Tax appears as spikes in Direct
Taxation of around 1% of GDP during 1998 and then 2002. Finally, the cession
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Full sample Early adopters Late adopters
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Avg Population 2335.5 (2071.7) 3467.6 (2432.4) 1542.9 (1410.9)
Avg. GDP per capita 12821.7 (2639.7) 13172.8 (2585.0) 12575.9 (2787.5)
Avg. real GDP growth 3.71 (0.58) 3.70 (0.56) 3.74 (0.63)
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics for Early adopters and Late adopters. Population is
measured in thousands, GDP in Euros and growth rates are computet year-on-year.
Standard deviation in parenthesis. Years 1984-2007.
of part of the Value Added Tax creates a spike on Indirect Taxation of 3.5% of
regional GDP during 2004. Notice also that figure 2.7 presents the first difference of
the relative fiscal variable and hence all episodes represent permanent shocks as the
prerogative is transferred to the region on a permanent basis.
2.3.3 Justification of the narrative approach
In order to identify the effect of decentralization on output, it is crucial that the
timing of the policy measures is not driven systematically by economic conditions.17
As we have discussed previously, the decentralization process in Spain is interesting
in this sense: because the timing of the implementation was brought about by the
political process, the shocks can be reasonably thought of as variations in fiscal policy
that are exogenous to economic conditions. In this section, we investigate the claim
of exogeneity in two ways.
As a first approximation, we divide the regions into early and late adopters to
see if we observe systematic differences between these groups. We classify as early
adopters to those regions that took the initiative to decentralize competences and,
therefore, got these competences early; and as late adopters the regions that only
received competences on the framework of nationwide agreements, where the central
government took the initiative. The sorting - motivated by the historical accounts of
the decentralization process provided in the previous section - is displayed in table ??
in Appendix D. The differences in terms of the timing of decentralization are indeed
17If, for example, the implementation is carried out during episodes of (non-) favorable economic
forecasts, we might find a spurious positive (negative) effect from decentralization to output growth.
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substantial: for example, the average year in which the decentralization of health
services occurred was 1988 for the early adopters and 2000 for the late adopters.
Table 2.4 shows that while early adopters are larger regions in terms of population,
there appears to be no systematic differences in GDP per capita or growth rates for
our sample period.
To further justify our narrative approach - in particular to exclude economic
conditions as a cause for the introduction of decentralization - we perform four pre-
dictive regressions of the following form: as independent variable, we defined dummy
variables (one for each of the three types of decentralization shocks and another one
picking up any decentralization shock) with value 1 on the years where we have iden-
tified a decentralization shock in our series and 0 otherwise. As dependent variables
we use lags of real regional GDP annual growth. Due to the nature of our data, we
use a panel data regression with fixed effects in a linear probability framework. The
results of this exercise can be seen in table 2.5.
As can be seen, we fail to observe any consistent and significant impact from
past GDP growth on the timing of the decentralization shocks. The largest and
only significant coefficient corresponds to the contemporaneous relationship between
decentralization and growth and plausibly - in particular due to the absence of any
effects from lagged output growth - captures the effect from decentralization on
growth. Both pieces of evidence reinforce our interpretation that the timing of the
decentralization episodes where mostly politically motivated and hence exogenous to
current output growth, justifying the use of the narrative approach as outlined in
the next section.
2.3.4 Empirical framework
The empirical specification extends the regression framework proposed by Romer
and Romer (2010) to panel data: we employ fixed effects regressions (i.e. including
region-specific intercepts) with real regional output growth as the dependent variable.
The regressors include the series of decentralization shocks, including lags, as
well as a lag of output growth. More specifically, denoting by dirt, indt and spet
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Direct taxation Indirect taxation Spending Any shock
∆Y 1.533 0.877 0.956 2.703*
(0.93) (0.69) (0.86) (1.40)
∆Y (−1) 0.607 -0.338 -0.072 -0.032
(0.92) (0.68) (0.85) (1.38)
∆Y (−2) -0.931 -0.077 0.351 -0.381
(0.87) (0.64) (0.80) (1.30)
∆Y (−3) 0.402 0.874 0.316 1.164
(0.75) (0.56) (0.70) (1.13)
∆Y (−4) -0.041 0.537 -0.297 -0.017
(0.67) (0.50) (0.62) (1.01)
Constant 0.031 -0.021 0.028 0.049
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07)
R-squared 0.018 0.021 0.010 0.020
No. of obs. 323 323 323 323
Table 2.5: Regression results for the effects of past GDP growth on the probability
of implementing a decentralization measure. The dependent variable is a dummy
that takes on the value 1 in the years when reforms where implemented.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .90, .95 and .99 level, respectively
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our series of Direct Taxation shocks, Indirect Taxation shocks and Spending shocks
respectively, the regression framework is
∆Yi,t = ai + ρ∆Yi,t−1 +
M∑
i=0
bjDi,t−j + ei,t, (2.8)
where Yi,t is the logarithm of real regional output in region i at time t and D =
{dir, ind, spe} is our measure of decentralization. Estimations are carried out
for the joint set of fiscal policy shocks series, as well as for the individual and the
aggregate (sum of the three single series) series. In order to allow for a lag in the
output reaction to decentralization, we include five lags of the fiscal policy shocks,
i.e. M = 5, and one lag of GDP growth, to control for the usual autoregressive
dynamics of GDP growth.
We measure output using nominal series of regional GDP deflated by an annual
average price index for every region. D = {dir, ind, spe} is our measure of changes
in decentralization as a % of regional GDP. The data is yearly, the period of analysis
is 1985-2007 and the cross-sectional units are the 17 Comunidades Auto´nomas.
2.3.5 Results
This section presents and discusses the estimation results for the effects of the dif-
ferent type of decentralization shocks. Table 2.9 in Appendix D presents the results
for the regressions of equation 2.8. Then, following Romer and Romer (2010), we
compute the dynamic multiplier, taking into account the implied changes in the path
of GDP:
Dynamic multiplier (m) ≡ δm = bm + ρ δm−1 (2.9)
where m = {1, 5} and δ0 = b0. The standard errors are computed by taking 10,000
draws of the coefficient vector from a multivariate normal distribution with mean
and variance-covariance matrix equal to the point estimates and variance-covariance
matrix of the regression coefficients.
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Figure 2.8: Estimated dynamic impact of an spending decentralization shock, single
and joint regressions. Thinner lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
Spending decentralization
The decentralization of spending categories like health care and non-tertiary educa-
tion were some of the largest, in terms of regional GDP, transfers of competences
registered in our database. However, we find only a small effect (if at all) of these
transfers on regional growth.
On the individual regression, without the other two shocks included, a transfer of
spending competences equivalent to 1% of GDP would achieve its maximum effect
4 years after the shock, adding less than 0.4 percentage points to regional GDP
on that period, although for most periods the effect is not significant at the 95%
confidence level. When we introduce the other two shocks in the regression, the
spending decentralization shocks are no longer significant and the size of their effect
is smaller.
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Figure 2.9: Estimated dynamic impact of an indirect taxation decentralization shock,
single and joint regressions. Thinner lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
Indirect taxation decentralization
In the case of the decentralization of indirect taxation competences, we find a some-
what larger effect that is, however, only significant in the long term (after 3 years) in
the joint regression. On the single regression, a decentralization of indirect taxation
equivalent to 1% of regional GDP would add a maximum of around 0.5 percentage
points to regional growth after 2 years. However, after controlling for the other
shocks, this decentralization shock only gains significance after 3 years and the size
of the effect is similar, peaking at 0.48 percentage points after 4 years.
To put this result in perspective, during the sample period of 1984-2007, the
Spanish regions grew an average of 3.71% yearly. The average indirect taxation
decentralization shock amounted to 3.70% of regional GDP which, multiplied by the
dynamic effect computed before, implies an increase of 1.76 percentage points 4 years
after the introduction of the shock, when the peak effect is registered. This number
amounts to a 47% bump on the average regional growth rate. Over five years, a
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Figure 2.10: Estimated dynamic impact of a direct taxation decentralization shock,
single and joint regressions. Thinner lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
region would have grown 24.43% on average over the course of five years. After the
introduction of the decentralization shock, taking into account the dynamic effect on
every period, the accumulated growth would be of 29.73 per cent.
Direct taxation decentralization
The decentralization of direct taxation registers the largest effects on regional GDP
growth despite being, on average, the smaller of the three shocks considered. Further-
more, the decentralization of direct taxation is the only one whose effect is positive
and statistically significant for any number of lags considered. When the direct taxa-
tion shocks are included as regressors individually, the maximum estimated dynamic
effect of decentralizing direct taxation by a quantity equivalent to 1% of regional
GDP would be to add 1.73 percentage points to regional GDP after 3 years. When
all decentralization shocks series are included in the regression, the maximum effect
peaks after 2 years at around 1.71 percentage points.
58
Similar to the case of the decentralization of indirect taxation, we can put this
number into perspective. In this case, the average direct decentraliaztion shock
amounted to around 1.06% of regional GDP, so the comparison is more straight-
forward. With an average growth of 3.71% yearly, the average region would have
added 1.81 percentage point to their growth two years after the decentralization, or
an increase of a 49 per cent. The accumulated growth of an average region on the
five years following the decentralization shock would be a 32.25%, versus a 24.43%
without the shock.
Aggregate decentralization shock
Finally, for reference, we consider an aggregate decentralization shock, constructed
simply by adding together the series of the three individual shocks. Doing so, we
observe how this aggregate shock is positive and statistically significant from impact,
peaking after 2 years with an dynamic effect of around 0.28 extra percentage points
added of regional GDP growth.
In our data, the average aggregate decentralization shock amounts to 2.90% of
regional GDP which, multiplied by the accumulated effect computed before, implies
adding 0.82 percentage points to GDP growth on the second year after the shock.
Over 5 years, the total accumulated GDP growth would be of 28.27%, an increase of
3.8 percentage points over the baseline.
2.3.6 Discussion
For a interpretation of these results, it is useful to place them in their historical
context. Furthermore, the results we have obtained in the previous section allow us
to connect with the prevailing theories of fiscal federalism.
First, the changes on spending decentralization involved mainly the transfer of the
competences on Health Care and Education to the regions. Since all regions already
had functioning sanitary and educative sectors, the margin for fiscal maneuver was
limited: collective agreements with the workers had to be honored and standards
were set so as to ensure that every citizen in the country had access to a similar
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Figure 2.11: Estimated dynamic impact of an aggregate decentralization shock.
Thinner lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
level of services, for example. Therefore, it is to be expected that the spending
decentralization shocks studied here will have a small effect on the economic output
of the regions, if at all.
Second, the changes in indirect taxation consisted typically in an increase of the
proportion of taxes collected on the region that the regional governments could hold
on to. On the one hand, these changes were usually matched with corresponding
reductions on the amount of transfers received from the central government. Fur-
thermore, the tax rates for the VAT are decided at the central level and are the same
for all regions. On the other hand, decentralizing the collection of indirect taxation
can in principle induce the regional governments to foster economic growth, as it
expands the tax base and so increases their income. This idea follows the arguments
developed in the so-called “Second generation fiscal federalism”, that emphasizes the
importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosperity.18 The lower
18For a survey in the topic, see for example Weingast (2009).
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reliance on transfers and higher reliance on own resources could nudge the regions
into introducing measures destined to expand their tax base and create economic
growth. In principle, this mechanism would explain the fact that the decentraliza-
tion of indirect taxation only turns significant after some years, as the potential
changes introduced by the regions to foster growth and so reap the benefits of an
increased tax base would take time to materialize.
Finally, the decentralization of direct taxation registers a significant, positive
effect on regional income growth. The key in this case is that the decentralization of
the income tax included the possibility for regional government to modify legislative
aspects, such as tax rates, brackets and deductions, affecting their tax scheme design
as well as total taxes collected. Therefore, the decentralization of direct taxation
implied not only a change in the way a region finances itself, as the decentralization
of indirect taxation, but also opened up the possibility for the regions to conduct
fiscal policy.
On top of the possible effect on the incentives to increase the tax base, the de-
centralization of direct taxation plus giving legislative powers on taxation to the
regions opened a new channel of influence of decentralization on growth: tax com-
petition. Allowing regional governments to (partially) set the tax rates can promote
tax competition between jurisdictions, resulting in lower tax rate and promoting
growth. A modified version of this theory can be traced back to the work of Bren-
nan and Buchanan (1980), where the authors used the tax competition argument to
partly construct the “Leviathan hypothesis”: more-decentralized government struc-
tures should be smaller, in terms of government spending, relative to the size of the
economy.
In fact, we find some evidence of tax competition, as can be seen in figure 2.12.
The average effective tax rate naturally grows over time as the nominal tax base
grows and workers move into higher brackets. There are two big drops in the aver-
age effective tax rate that match exactly the years were the income tax was reformed
to allow the regions to keep part of the tax collected on their territory. Unfortu-
nately, the available data does not allow us to disentangle the part of the drop in the
average effective tax rate due to the decrease in the tax rate induced by the central
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Figure 2.12: Average effective tax rate and tax base (in millions of euros) for the
labor income tax. Spain 1995-2007. Source: Agencia Tributaria.
government from the part induced by the regional governments.
The results discussed here also tie nicely with the analysis in the previous sec-
tion. In the first part we saw how more decentralized countries tend to have larger
multipliers corresponding to their fiscal policy. Similarly, the second part showed
how moving into more decentralized political structures produces a positive effect on
the economic growth of the regions involved. The main conclusion from the paper
is, therefore, in line with the classical theory of fiscal decentralization: fiscal policy
becomes more effective when it allows the regions to design policies better tailored to
their citizens. At the same time, it is important to notice that the focus of this study
were the short term dynamics and transition mechanisms for fiscal policy. Potential
long run effects that include a more detailed investigation of regional debt dynamics,
for example, are left for further research.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper evaluates empirically the effects from decentralizing fiscal policy. The
first section comprises a cross-country analysis of 11 European countries that differ
substantially in their degree of decentralization. We find that more decentralized
countries, i.e. countries in which regions have larger fiscal competences relative to
the central government, tend to have larger fiscal multipliers. We interpret this result
as evidence of favorable gains from regionally tailored fiscal policy.
We also provide evidence from a case study of Spain, where we exploit time vari-
ation in its decentralization process. These decentralization changes were orthogonal
to economic conditions, and can therefore be used to measure the direct impact of
decentralization on output growth. We find economically large and statistically sig-
nificant positive effects from the decentralization of direct taxation, and, to a lesser
extent, from indirect taxation and government spending on GDP growth. Part of
the positive effect on output growth can be attributed to a reduction in taxes rates,
and is likely to be attributed to tax competition between provinces. In line with our
cross-country analysis, the results from the case study of Spain reinforce the evidence
for the existence of efficiency gains through (regionally) tailored fiscal policy.
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C Decentralization measures and cross-country com-
parison
Alternative measures of decentralization
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Figure 2.13: Decentralization index: regional share of spending including transfers
in %, 1996-2011. Averages along with highest and lowest observation.
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Figure 2.14: Decentralization index: regional share of taxation including transfers in
%, 1996-2011. Averages along with highest and lowest observation.
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Decentralization and key economic variables
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Figure 2.15: Decentralization index vs. size of government spending.
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Figure 2.16: Decentralization index vs. government debt
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Spending Con. Spending Inv. Spending Revenues
Austria 0.233 0.209 0.0247 0.500
(0.0193) (0.0111) (0.00907) (0.0268)
Denmark 0.288 0.251 0.0371 0.541
(0.0121) (0.00754) (0.00792) (0.0180)
France 0.282 0.240 0.0425 0.487
(0.0109) (0.00938) (0.00265) (0.0123)
Germany 0.216 0.192 0.0241 0.413
(0.0116) (0.0103) (0.00304) (0.0270)
Greece 0.234 0.206 0.0321 0.352
(0.00743) (0.0106) (0.00468) (0.0669)
Italy 0.232 0.208 0.0246 0.421
(0.0161) (0.0134) (0.00328) (0.0367)
Portugal 0.226 0.183 0.0432 0.345
(0.0122) (0.0128) (0.00566) (0.0901)
Spain 0.197 0.159 0.0384 0.361
(0.0190) (0.0124) (0.00813) (0.0289)
Sweden 0.366 0.322 0.0435 0.581
(0.0347) (0.0323) (0.00474) (0.0248)
Switzerland 0.148 0.115 0.0327 0.327
(0.00816) (0.00604) (0.00321) (0.0290)
UK 0.239 0.221 0.0174 0.374
(0.0202) (0.0227) (0.00393) (0.0309)
Table 2.6: Spending and Revenues over GDP by country. Spending denotes the sum
of government consumption and investment expenditure; Cons. and Inv. Spending
stand for consumption and investment spending, respectively. Standard deviations
in parenthesis. Quarterly observations, 1980-2007.
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GDP growth (X+IM)/GDP Population Gross debt/GDP
Austria 1.946 2.951 7.853 63.27
(1.154) (0.626) (0.252) (4.403)
Denmark 1.961 2.444 5.232 54.88
(1.656) (0.261) (0.117) (15.43)
France 1.656 1.821 57.46 46.07
(1.177) (0.258) (2.302) (15.77)
Germany 1.705 2.304 80.11 56.35
(1.487) (0.451) (2.450) (8.688)
Greece 1.704 1.417 10.46 72.77
(2.528) (0.133) (0.494) (27.80)
Italy 1.665 1.782 56.91 101.9
(1.262) (0.252) (0.464) (9.609)
Portugal 2.557 2.348 10.14 55.73
(2.439) (0.195) (0.219) (5.078)
Spain 2.380 1.620 39.88 44.95
(1.769) (0.338) (2.046) (13.16)
Sweden 2.094 2.332 8.699 56.87
(1.776) (0.421) (0.276) (11.20)
Switzerland 1.199 2.618 6.883 48.63
(1.796) (0.315) (0.383) (12.81)
United Kingdom 2.412 1.785 57.99 41.72
(1.602) (0.103) (1.404) (4.876)
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics for additional determinants of fiscal multipliers by
country, yearly observations 1980-2007. Population is in millions. Standard devia-
tiosn in parenthesis. Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
Database and eLibrary.
68
Bootstrap algorithm for averaged multipliers
This section describes the bootstrap algorithm used for obtaining the confidence
bands for the average multiplier across a specific country group.
1. Draw n nonparametric impulse responses (IRFs) for each country individually.
Each of the n IRFs is obtained by bootstrapping the residuals and reestimating
the VAR. In each replication, the residuals drawn have the same time index t
for each country in a respective group.
2. Standardize each impulse response by dividing by the size of the fiscal shock
and the average fiscal variable to GDP ratio.
3. Draw (with replacement) one impulse response function for each country in
the respective group. These draws are not independent across countries, but
ensure that the impulse reponse function of each country are based on on the
same time index t residuals. Then compute the average impulse response for
each horizon.
4. Repeat step 3 m times.
5. Compute Hall (2013)-percentiles from m draws obtained above (as described
e.g. in Lu¨tkepohl 2005).
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Robustness: Results from 2-variable VARs
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Figure 2.17: Cummulative spending multipliers, average across country group. The
multipliers describe the output response to a positive spending shock. Estimates are
based on a 2-variable VAR including output and government spending.
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Figure 2.18: Cummulative revenue multipliers, average across country group. The
multipliers describe the output response to a negative tax shock. Estimates are based
on a 2-variable VAR including output and government revenues.
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Figure 2.19: Cummulative spending multipliers, average across country group. The
multipliers describe the output response to a positive government consumption shock.
Estimates are based on a 2-variable VAR including output and government consump-
tion spending.
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Figure 2.20: Cummulative spending multipliers, average across country group. The
multipliers describe the output response to a positive government investment shock.
Estimates are based on a 2-variable VAR including output and government invest-
ment spending.
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D Intranational evidence
Justification of the narrative approach
Early adopters Late adopters
Andaluc´ıa Arago´n
Canarias Asturias
Catalunya Islas Baleares
Galicia Castilla-La Mancha
Navarra Cantabria
Pa´ıs Vasco Castilla y Leo´n
Comunitat Valenciana Extremadura
Comunidad de Madrid
Murcia
La Rioja
Table 2.8: Early-late adopters list
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Regression results
A B C D
∆Y (−1) 0.3512*** 0.4205*** 0.4315*** 0.3196***
(0.05866) (0.05685) (0.04804) (0.07006)
Direct taxation 0.0083*** 0.0116***
(0.00149) (0.00205)
L.Direct taxation 0.0102*** 0.0129***
(0.00228) (0.00320)
L2.Direct taxation 0.0126*** 0.0118***
(0.00280) (0.00310)
L3.Direct taxation 0.0113*** 0.0078**
(0.00218) (0.00273)
L4.Direct taxation 0.0055** -0.0014
(0.00221) (0.00254)
L5.Direct taxation 0.0047 -0.0023
(0.00290) (0.00295)
Indirect taxation 0.0017* -0.0012
(0.00086) (0.00083)
L.Indirect taxation 0.0023*** 0.0002
(0.00049) (0.00103)
L2.Indirect taxation 0.0037*** 0.0016**
(0.00078) (0.00073)
L3.Indirect taxation 0.0022** 0.0022**
(0.00077) (0.00086)
L4.Indirect taxation 0.0022** 0.0039***
(0.00077) (0.00117)
L5.Indirect taxation 0.0007 0.0028
(0.00127) (0.00168)
Spending 0.0015 0.0006
(0.00095) (0.00106)
L.Spending -0.0000 -0.0013
(0.00125) (0.00157)
L2.Spending 0.0014 0.0017*
(0.00157) (0.00089)
L3.Spending 0.0027*** 0.0018*
(0.00079) (0.00104)
L4.Spending 0.0023 0.0007
(0.00136) (0.00150)
L5.Spending -0.0014 -0.0017
(0.00171) (0.00157)
Constant 0.0163*** 0.0172*** 0.0173*** 0.0166***
(0.00132) (0.00154) (0.00137) (0.00142)
R-squared 0.3151 0.2745 0.2441 0.3443
No. of obs. 267 261 306 260
Table 2.9: Regressions results for the effect of a decentralization shock on ∆Y, the
(log) growth rate of regional GDP
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .90, .95 and .99 level, respectively
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Chapter 3
Regional decentralization and
National debt: some lessons for
the European Project
3.1 Introduction
Public debt, and how to control it, has been on the spotlight during the current
economic crisis. The levels of national debt have been increasing steadily since 2007
and the efforts to curb this tendency are now a priority for most European countries.
On the policy debate about how to control national debt and, particularly, on
how to reduce government spending, regional governments are receiving a great deal
of attention. To name just a few examples, there are debates in Spain about the
elimination of the provinces (tier 2 regional government) or the devolution of some
responsibilities, like health care and education, back to the central government. The
debate is also present in a federal country like Austria, where the existence of 10
regional parliaments has been critisized for, according to their detractors, leading to
wasteful expending. This consideration of some levels of government as unnecessary
expenditure appears in the austerity plans outlined by some European countries. In
Italy, after years of debate, finally the decree “Salva Italia”, the Italian austerity
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plan, includes the elimination of the provinces, a regional government tier between
the region and the municipality.1 In Portugal, the bailout accord, called “Memo-
randum of understanding on specific economic policy conditionality”, includes an
article about reducing the number of municipalities.2 Greece introduced in 2010 the
Kallikra´tis Plan, aimed at reducing the number of municipalities by 2/3, while at the
same time also reducing some of the duties of the lower tiers of government. Even a
country that has not been hit as hard by the current crisis, France, introduced during
the summer of 2014 a plan to reduce the number of Regions (tier 2 regional govern-
ments) from 22 to 14. Proposals to limit public spending by consolidating regional
governments have extended outside the Euro Area: the Danish Municipal Reform
of 2007 divided the country into 5 Regions, replacing the existing 17 Counties and
the number of municipalities was cut from 270 to 98; likewise, Sweden is studying a
proposal to reduce the number of Counties from the existing 21 to 6 or 9.
The importance of regional governments on controlling government spending is
obvious, for two reasons: first, government spending is not carried away completely
by the central government in any country in Europe. In some European countries,
regional governments are responsible for more than half of the total government
spending. Second, controlling spending can be potentially problematic when part of
it is carried away by the regional governments, which can have different goals, agendas
or electoral interests than the central government. The problem for the central
government then is not only to decide on the reduction of government spending, but
also to enforce fiscal consolidation through the regional governments. Because of
these two reasons, regional governments, especially in those countries with highly
decentralized structures, are considered a key factor for controlling debt. In some
cases, regions have even being considered the origin of the debt problem, blamed
for creating a duplication of public services, over-spending or free riding the central
1Decreto-legge 6/12/2011 n201, art.23
2Article 3.43 reads: “[...] There are currently around 308 municipalities and 4,259 parishes. By
July 2012, the government will develop a consolidation plan to reorganize and significantly reduce
the number of such entities. The Government will implement these plans based on agreement with
EC and IMF staff. These changes, which will come into effect by the beginning of the next local
election cycle, will enhance service delivery, improve efficiency, and reduce costs.”
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government.
However, is there any evidence supporting that decentralized regional structures
affect negatively the level of debt of a country? Does giving more power to the
regions make them overspend? This paper addresses these questions both theoreti-
cally and empirically. First, I present a theoretical two period model with a central
government and a set of regional governments as strategic players that reverses the
standard result on the literature of a positive relation between decentralization and
debt. In the model, all tiers of governments can tax, spend and issue debt, so as to
replicate the setup of most European countries. Initially, free-riding on the part of
the regions could arise because of a common-pool problem: as taxation is costly in
terms of utility, the regional governments will try to spread the burden by issuing
debt, knowing that the central government will have the incentives to bail them out
in the end, in order to avoid a default. However, as observed on the data, regional
governments depend economically on the transfers received from the central govern-
ment. This dependence can be used as leverage by the latter to eliminate the free
riding incentives of the regions. I show that the central government can credibly
threat the regions with cutting back the transfer they receive, and so the regions
curb their spending.
Then, using panel data for a sample of 31 European countries over the last 18
years, I examine the relationship between government decentralization and the level
of debt. The empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis of a positive relation
between decentralization and debt. Instead, the relation between both variables is
insignificant, as predicted by the theoretical model.
The next section reviews the existing literature on the topic. Section 3 builds
a theoretical model that reverses the standard results of the literature, section 4
explores the empirical relation between fiscal decentralization and debt, based on
the hypothesis derived from the theoretical model, and, finally, Section 5 concludes
and offers some relation between the main results of the paper and some current
policy issues in the Euro Area.
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3.2 Literature review
The debate on the advantages and disadvantages, from a theoretical standpoint, of
fiscal decentralization goes way back in time; for example, Tiebout (1952) and Oates
et al. (1972) claimed that the decentralized provision of public goods enhances eco-
nomic efficiency because of the informational advantages, thanks to being closer to
their electorate, of regional governments with respect to the central government. On
a similar note, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) explained how tax competition between
jurisdictions, resulting in lower tax rates, restrains the growth of local governments
and improve economic performance in general, whereas in Mello (2000) fiscal decen-
tralization also strengthens the accountability of subnational governments towards
their electorate.
On the other hand, papers like Rodden (2002) or Bordignon (2006) focus on one
of the main problems of fiscal decentralization: the common pool problem, where
subnational governments receive funds from a central common pool and fail to fully
internalize the costs of public funding. On a similar note, Goodspeed (2002) estab-
lishes how, in a dynamic setting, the accumulated subnational debt will feed the
demand for a bailout by the central government through increased transfers, since
the increase in taxation will be shared by all jurisdictions.
Relatedly, Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2008) highlights the relation between
a country’s decentralized or federal structure and a subsequent tendency to over-
accumulate debt. They characterize the conditions under which bailouts within a
fiscal union can take place. In their paper, the first best allocation is achieved via ex-
ante federalism, so that the distortionary taxes can be better spread among a larger
group of agents. However, to support this allocation, the central government needs
commitment power; ex-post, the central government may not be able to commit to
its policies. Depending on the spending of the regions, the central government may
have incentives to bailout their debt. In such case, regions can and will take advan-
tage of the situation by running higher deficits. See also Chari and Kehoe (1998) and
Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004) for further studies dealing with commitment and
debt. Lack of commitment, however, is not the only explanation in the literature
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for the apparent excess of debt issued by regional governments. Garc´ıa-Mila´ and
McGuire (2007) blame the positive correlation between debt and decentralization
on a timing issue: in the case of Spain, the decentralization of spending was made
before the decentralization of taxation.
A related strand of the literature has looked at the effect of different political con-
figurations on debt. The standard conclusion of this literature is that more divided
governments tend to accumulate more debt and/or run higher deficits; see for exam-
ple, Roubini et al. (1989), Volkerink and Haan (2001) or Perotti and Kontopoulos
(2002). These papers, however, deal with political fragmentation, be it on the com-
position of the government or the number of members of its cabinet and, therefore,
do not relate exactly to the topic of regional fragmentation and debt accumulation
discussed on this paper.
Empirically, the closest paper to this one is Rompuy (2012). His analysis con-
cludes that higher vertical expenditure redistribution did not weaken subnational
fiscal discipline, whereas revenue decentralization contributed positively to better
aggregate budgetary outcomes of the lower level governments. In addition to subna-
tional tax autonomy, balanced budget requirements sustained fiscal discipline. Tax
sharing arrangements and intergovernmental grants also enhanced the positive im-
pact of own taxes on subnational fiscal balances. Also similar, although using a
measure of tax decentralization, Asatryan, Feld, and Geys (2012) find supportive
evidence for the idea that higher revenue decentralization (measured as the sub-
national governments share of own source tax revenues) is associated with improved
sub-national government budget balances.
The model of this paper places particular emphasis on the role of transfers to mit-
igate the common pool problem. In this respect, Mello (2000) finds that the transfer
dependency of the subnational governments improves the budgetary performance on
OECD countries. On the contrary, Rodden (2002) concludes that as countries rely
more on intergovernmental transfers over time, both their national and subnational
fiscal performance decline. However, borrowing restrictions or a high degree of taxing
autonomy contribute to mitigate the problem for the subnational governments. Fi-
nally, Plekhanov and Singh (2006) document how centrally imposed fiscal rules (and
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cooperative agreements) have a favorable impact on subnational deficits, particularly
when lower level governments are strongly dependent on vertical transfers.
3.3 A basic model of fiscal unions
In what follows, I build a basic model of a fiscal union capable of reversing the
standard result on the literature of a positive relationship between decentralization
and debt.
Basic features
The basic model draws from Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2008). I use a two-period
real economy without money. The main actors in this economy are a number n of
regional governments and a central government that monitors them. All fiscal entities
have full fiscal independence, being able to levy taxes, spend on public goods and
issue debt. The setup of the aforementioned paper had just two regional governments
with more limited functions. This way, this model is able to reflect better on the
problematic of a federal state, the goal of this paper.
Agents live for two periods. On each period they supply labor and consume
the single good of the economy. Each unit of labor produces one unit of the final
good; the production of the good can be consumed or stored. Agents have access
to a storage technology with an exogenous return of R. The possibility of regional
mobility is excluded.3
The representative agent in region i solves
max
n1,n2,si
u
(
g1 + e+ n1(1− τ1)− n
1+γ
1
1 + γ
− si
)
+ β
(
g2 + n2(1− τ2)− n
1+γ
2
1 + γ
+ siR
)
(3.1)
where u(·) and is strictly increasing and concave. τ1 and τ2 represent the taxes
3According to the Special Eurobarometer 337 only 10% of Europeans have ever lived and worked
abroad. The reasons alleged for not moving are easily applicable to the national case; therefore,
excluding regional mobility does not appear to be an extreme assumption.
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faced by the agent on each period. Hence, ni(1− τi) is the labor income after taxes
and
n1+γi
1+γ
is the disutility from working.
Public spending per capita enters as a perfect substitute for consumption on both
periods. The agent receives this public spending from both the central government
and her regional government, distributed according to an exogenous parameter δ:
on aggregate, the agents receive (1− δ)gi from the central government and δgi from
the regional government. Therefore, the exogenous parameter δ mimics the decen-
tralization measure used in the following section and is therefore a key element of
the analysis. Public spending is random, so gi is composed out of the realized values
of a random variable G, with a known distribution, from where the central and the
regional governments draw.
Throughout the paper, taxation is collected by the regional governments in the
first period and by the central government in the second period. With this timing for
taxation, I intend to represent the dependence of the regions on the central govern-
ment, a stylized fact explained on the next section. Because taxation is distortionary,
the regions are not able to raise enough income in the first period so as to finance
their spending in both periods. Therefore, on the second period, the regions will
depend on a transfer from the central government to finance the spending they have
to carry out and the debt they have to repay. As we will see, this modified timing
does not affect the incentives of the regions to free ride the central government, but
it opens the possibility of the central government to use coercive measures.
In any period, and for any prevailing tax rate in that period, the first order
condition for labor is
(1− τ) 1γ = n (3.2)
Call this labor relationship n(τ). Further, call I(τ) ≡ τn(τ)4 to the level of
tax revenue for any given tax level and Z(τ) ≡ (1 − τ)n(τ) − n(τ)1+γ
1+γ
to the total
contribution to consumption from work, net of the disutility it creates. The problem
4Throughout the paper, it will be assumed that we are in the upward part of the Laffer curve,
so that if there are multiple levels of τ so that I(τ) = X, I select the lowest value of τ .
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then becomes
W (τ1, τ2 | g1, g2) = max
s
u (g1 + e+ Z(τ1)− s) + β (g2 + Z(τ2) + sR) (3.3)
The agent can save either through storage or government bonds, with the same
return in equilibrium. The endowment e is assumed to be large enough so that the
non-negativity constrain is fulfilled. The first order condition of the problem is
u′(c1) = Rβ (3.4)
First best solution
To obtain the first best solution, there is a central planning entity, setting taxes on
both periods. To allow for comparability, the regions collect taxes on the first period,
so there might be a different tax rate for every region, and the central government
on the second, so that the tax rate is common. The optimal tax policy solves
max
τ i1,τ2
n∑
i=1
∆iW (τ i1, τ2 | g1, g2) (3.5)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
g1 +
g2
R
=
n∑
i=1
∆iI(τ i1) +
1
R
[
n∑
i=1
∆iI(τ2)
]
(3.6)
where ∆i is the share of the population in region i.
Proposition 1. The solution to the optimal tax policy problem entails taxation
smoothing over all regions and all periods, so that τ i1 = τ
∗
1 ∀i and τ ∗1 = τ ∗2 = τ ∗.
Proof The first order conditions with respect to τ i1, τ2 of the problem are
u′(ci1)Z
′(τ i1) = λI
′(τ i1) (3.7)
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βZ ′(τ2) =
λ
R
I ′(τ2) (3.8)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the restriction. Combining both and using the
household’s first order condition (3.4)
Z ′(τ i1)
I ′(τ i1)
=
Z ′(τ2)
I ′(τ2)
(3.9)
Let ξ(τ) be the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the tax rate. Then, from
the first order condition for labor ξ(τ) = − τ
γ(1−τ) , monotonically decreasing in τ . By
definition,
Z′(τ i1)
I′(τ i1)
= − 1
1+ξ(τ)
, also monotone in τ . Therefore, as τ2 is common for all
regions, then τ i1 = τ
∗
1 ∀i and τ ∗1 = τ ∗2 = τ ∗. 
In this first best scenario, the central planning authority uses its power to perfectly
smooth taxation across all regions and all periods. Since, in most countries of the
sample, the central authority retains the power to set the tax rates, this result is
generally observed in the data. Even in countries that let their regions set some tax
rates, like Spain, the regional differences are small. The only exception is Switzerland,
where the difference in some tax rates among regions is up to 20 points.5
The debt level of this economy and, in fact, of any economy throughout the paper,
is the combination of the central government’s and regional debt
B = Bc +
n∑
i=1
∆iBi = (1− δ)g1 +
[
δg1 −
n∑
i=1
∆iI(τ ∗1 )
]
= g1 − I(τ ∗1 ) (3.10)
The level of debt of the economy will be a function of the tax rate during the
first period, but it is independent of the level of decentralization of the economy
δ. However, there is an important underlying assumption: this allocation can be
supported because the planning authority has perfect commitment power. In the
next subsection I discuss the case where the central government and the regions take
decisions independently.
5Source: Office fe´de´ral de la statistique.
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Decentralized equilibrium
In the decentralized equilibrium, all strategic players on the model are autonomous
and they interact between them. As is standard in this kind of models, the central
government tries to maximize the welfare of all agents, whereas the regional govern-
ments only care about their own agents. The timing of the game played between the
economic agents in the economy, both strategic and competitive, is as follows:
• Period 1
– Nature selects g1, g2, δ
– Regional governments carry out their spending, so that it adds up to
δg1. Each regional government i sets τ
i
1 given spending. If tax revenue is
insufficient, they issue debt
– Central government spends (1− δ)g1, financed with debt
– Private agents make their labor and saving decisions taking into account
the actions of the governments
• Period 2
– Central government spends (1 − δ)g2, sets τ2, uses the revenue to cover
its spending and repay its debt, and distributes the remaining part to the
regions
– Using the transfer from the central government, the regions repay their
debt and spend δg2
– If any government does not fully cover its obligations, there is a default
and the affected agents incur a utility loss of 
– Private agents make their labor decisions taking into account the actions
of the governments
The default cost  is big enough so that governments want to avoid a default at all
costs; therefore, the penalty is never realized along the equilibrium path.
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Consistent with previous literature, in equilibrium, there is a full bailout of re-
gional debt and, in anticipation, regions run excessive debts, creating a welfare re-
ducing distortion of the taxation profile.
Proposition 2 In the decentralized equilibrium, the central government sets a tax
rate τ d2 such that I(τ
d
2 ) = g2 +B and the regional governments set τ
i
1 < τ
d
2 ∀i,
where welfare is lower than in the first best equilibrium.
Proof Looking to avoid a default, the central government will bailout any outstand-
ing debt of the regions. Therefore the central governments sets a tax rate τ d2 high
enough so as to cover everything:
I(τ d2 ) = g2 +B = g2 +R
[
Bc +
n∑
i=1
∆iBi
]
(3.11)
Denote σ(g2, B
c, Bi) the smallest value of τ d2 satisfying (3.11). By the implicit
function theorem:
σi(g2, B
c, Bi) =
∂σ
∂Bi
=
∆iR
I ′(τ d2 )
(3.12)
Knowing this, each region solves its problem in period 1
max
τ i1
u
(
g1 + e+ Z(τ
i
1)− s
)
+ β
(
g2 + Z(σ(g2, B
c, Bi)) +Rsi
)
(3.13)
Using Bi = gi−I(τ i1), the first order condition of the households and σi(g2, Bc, Bi)
from above, the first order condition is
Z ′(τ i1)
I ′(τ i1)
= ∆i
Z ′(τ d2 )
I ′(τ d2 )
(3.14)
As ∆i < 1, following a reasoning similar than in Proposition 1, τ i1 < τ
d
2 ∀i.
Furthermore, we can conclude that welfare on the decentralization equilibrium is
lower, as the solution was feasible when computing the first best and the tax rates
are different than in the first best solution. 
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The conclusion from Proposition 2 is that, even with the modified timing, the
regions still have incentives to free ride on the central government. Anticipating the
desire of the central government to avoid a default, and benefiting from the lack of
commitment of the central authority, the regions collect fewer taxes than in the first
best equilibrium, reducing welfare.
In terms of debt, looking at (3.10), for any level of δ, debt on the decentralized
equilibrium will be higher than under the first best, as τ i1 < τ
∗
1 ∀i. Hence, I obtain the
result expected on the current literature, where a decentralized system accumulates
more debt than a centralized one and regions free-ride the central government.
The question then is, why would the central government allow the existence of
regional governments? In the next subsection I present an example of strategy that
the central government can follow to come back to the original first best solution.
Equilibrium with coercion
In the sample we explore on the next section, regions within a given country always
depend economically on the transfers from the central government to balance their
budgets. In this model, taxation is distortionary and the regions cannon raise enough
income in the first period to cover all their spending in the second period, so that
regions need the transfer of the central government. This hierarchical relation is
the main difference between regional and central governments, as they can otherwise
dispose of every fiscal instrument.
Therefore, it is not far-fetched to imagine that the central government can use
this dependence as leverage, steering the regions towards its desired result. With the
timing of the game I am developing, and always looking for sub-game perfect Nash
equilibria, this leverage can take the form of credible threats. In this framework,
for a threat to be credible, the welfare of the agents when the threat is realized
must be larger than when is not. For example, threatening with cutting the transfer
completely is not credible: the regions will have to default on their debt, with a huge
utility cost, so the central government will never implement the threat.
The desire of the central government to avoid a default guarantees the repayment
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of the regional debt. Thus, any threat has to deal with the part of the transfer
allocated to pay the regional spending that the regions have to carry out during the
second period.
Proposition 3. The central government can credibly threat the regional govern-
ment to reduce their transfer to T i = Bi if τ i1 < τ
∗
1 so that the economy ends
up in the first best equilibrium where τ i1 = τ
∗
1 = τ
∗
2 = τ
∗
Proof The threat of the central government is to reduce the transfer to the regions
at the beginning of period 2 to T i = Bi if τ i1 < τ
∗
1 , so that agents will receive only
(1 − δ)g2 in the second period. If the threat is realized, the regional governments
will not change their tax rate in the first period with respect to what they would do
if the threat was not realized. The reason is that government spending enters the
utility function of the agents in a lump-sum way. Therefore, the regions set the same
tax rate τ i1, computed in Proposition 2, irrespective of the threat being realized or
not.
The threat of the central government will only be credible if welfare when the
threat is realized, W t, is bigger than the welfare when is not, W d. In both situa-
tions, as we have seen, the tax rate on the first period will be the one computed in
Proposition 2, τ i1, with the same level of regional debt B
i. The central government,
however, will be able to lower its tax rate, as now it has to finance less spending,
such that
I(τ t2) = (1− δ)g2 +B = (1− δ)g2 +R
[
Bc +
n∑
i=1
∆iBi
]
(3.15)
subtracting (13) then
I(τ t2)− I(τ d2 ) = −δg2 (3.16)
That implies that τ t2 < τ
d
2 . The comparison of welfare, given that utility is lineal
in the second period, is just the comparison of what the agents gain, less distortionary
taxation, with what the agents lose, less government spending
W t −W d = Z(τ t2)− Z(τ d2 )− δg2 =
[
I(τ t2) + Z(τ
t
2)
]− [I(τ d2 ) + Z(τ d2 )] (3.17)
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where the last equality comes from substituting (3.16). Using the definitions of I(τ),
Z(τ) and the first order condition of labor
I(τ) + Z(τ) = τn(τ) +
[
n(τ)(1− τ)− n(τ)
1+γ
1 + γ
]
= (1− τ) 1γ − (1− τ)
1+γ
γ
1 + γ
(3.18)
Thus
∂ [I(τ) + Z(τ)]
∂τ
=
1
γ
(1− τ) 1γ
(
− τ
1− τ
)
< 0 (3.19)
So if τ t2 < τ
d
2 , then [I(τ
t
2) + Z(τ
t
2)] −
[
I(τ d2 ) + Z(τ
d
2 )
]
> 0 and finally W t > W d:
the threat is credible.
As the threat is credible, in the first period, the regional governments compare
between choosing τ ∗1 with a welfare W
∗ or τ i1 with welfare W
t, where clearly the
welfare under first best is higher. Therefore, the regions choose τ ∗1 and we end up in
first best. 
Proposition 3 shows that the central government can use its dominant position,
based on the economic dependence of the regions from its transfer, to steer the
regions into the first best equilibrium. The threat is an off-equilibrium event an so
it is never realized.
Hence, the model predicts no relation between decentralization and debt, as op-
posed to the positive relation usually described in the literature. This result is
achieved through the coercive ability of the central government. The model, there-
fore, establishes some hypothesis that I will test empirically on the next section:
a lack of correlation between fiscal decentralization and debt, a positive relation
between fiscal regional autonomy (implying a lower reliance on transfers from the
central government) and debt, and a lack of relation between setting borrowing limits
for the regions (as they play no role in the model) and debt accumulation.
3.4 Empirical analysis
In the following section, I test some of the hypothesis established by the theoretical
model described on the previous section, together with the replication of some papers
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on the literature that describe similar hypotheses.
3.4.1 Measuring decentralization: quantitative measures
Before looking for an empirical relation between decentralization and debt, we have
to deal with a key issue: while measuring the level of debt of a country is straight-
forward, how can we measure its degree of decentralization?
The choice is not obvious. As explained in the survey of Sharma (2006), the
literature is mainly split in two strands when it comes to measuring decentralization,
with those focusing in fiscal policy, and the relation between expenditures and allo-
cations, and those focusing in the nature of the intergovernmental relations and its
regulation.
In this paper, I will focus on the first approach, as it provides clearer measures
and data. In particular, the main measure I will focus on is defined as sub-national
(regional) spending as a percentage of total public spending. Sharma (2006) con-
cludes that when it comes to the measurement of fiscal decentralization “the share
of sub-national expenditures and revenues” is considered the best indicator. The
reason is that fiscal instruments are easier to measure while regulatory and finan-
cial instruments are extremely complex and difficult to measure statistically because
transfers seldom remain strictly confined to their technical objectives.
Reducing the degree of decentralization to a single dimension is not devoid of
problems. The potential costs come from the fact that, ignoring the regulatory
component, it is impossible to know if the regional spending was actually carried
away in an autonomous manner or if it was part of a central government’s mandate.
However, this type of decentralization measure is widely used in the literature
(see, e.g., Davoodi and Zou (1998), on economic growth; Oates (1985), on government
size; or Mello (2001), on fiscal balance). Even the critics of the regional share of
spending as a measure for decentralization, like Ebel and Yilmaz (2002), concede that
the measure is probably adequate for developed countries, which are not so affected
by issues of institutional quality and where local officers are elected democratically.
In this paper, I will further refine this measure by excluding part of the public
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spending from the computations. The data on public spending available on Eurostat
is categorized under the COFOG (Classification of the Functions of Government)
created by the United Nations.6 In the subsequent analysis, I will not include the
spending under the category CF01 General Public Services, whose main element are
interest payments on government debt and that also includes transfers between dif-
ferent levels of government. By excluding this component, I can solve two problems:
first, preventing some composition effect whereas a movement on interest payments
would appear as a change on decentralization, as such expenditures are always car-
ried out by the central government; and, second, excluding transfers between level
of governments to avoid accounting twice for some spending.
As I am going to focus the analysis on the regional spending share, it is worth
checking some descriptive statistics of the available data. The average of the decen-
tralization measure for the period and countries considered is 27.6%, implying that
a bit more than a quarter of total spending is carried out at the sub-national level.
There is a high degree of variability between countries, as can be observed in figure
3.1, with values as low as 0.5% for Malta and as high as 66.8% for Denmark.
Within countries, it is easy to observe in the time series level changes on the
decentralization measure for some countries, usually linked to a legislative change.
It is the case of the re-centralization of Health services in Ireland during 2004, the
creation of the Samospra´vne Kraje (self-governing regions) in 2002 in Slovakia or the
progressive decentralization process carried out in Spain.
As a robustness check, I consider other dimensions of public finances, like tax
income. In a way similar to spending, the available data allows us to compute the
share of tax revenue collected at the regional level. Here we find countries with a very
centralized tax collection, despite allowing for some degree of spending autonomy.
For example, looking at the average for 1995-2007, the tax income regional share of
The Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland is 4.85%, 4.78% and 3.62%, respectively,
when their spending share is 37.06%, 29.44% and 37.26%, respectively. This measure
will also be included in the empirical analysis.
6The detailed structure and explanatory notes can be found at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/
cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=4
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Figure 3.1: Regional share of spending and taxation income. Average 1995-2007.
Error bars show the max and min for the historical series.
In the next section I will add robustness to the selected decentralization measure,
by comparing it with a well-known qualitative index.
3.4.2 Measuring decentralization: a qualitative measure
In this section, I compare the regional share of government spending with a qualita-
tive index of decentralization. The potential shortcoming of my proposed measure of
decentralization is that it completely ignores the regulatory component of decentral-
ization; this is exactly the component that a qualitative measure tries to capture.
I consider the qualitative measure proposed by Christine Kearney. It is widely
used in the literature, especially but not exclusively on development economics. The
Kearney Index measures decentralization as the assignment of fiscal, political, and
administrative responsibilities to lower levels of government and it comprises nine
dimensions, designed to capture decentralization’s functional complexity.
Formally, this index is created by the analysis of 9 dimensions of decentralization,
90
which are valued from 0 (less decentralization) to a maximum of 4 points (more
decentralization) and then aggregated, for a maximum theoretical value of 36. The
nine dimensions, explained briefly here, are the following:
1. Government structure, with 4 points assigned to the country that has a federal
constitution.
2. Selection of regional executive: this category assigns 4 points if the citizens of
the country get to elect their regional executives.
3. Selection of local executive: same as 2 but for local executives.
4. Override authority: 4 points are assigned to the country in which the central
government does not have the right to override the decisions of the regional
governments, without a due process.
5. Revenue raising authority: in this category, 4 points are assigned if both the
local and the regional governments have the formal authority to raise revenue
through taxation, 2 points if one but not both sub-national entities are entitled
to tax and 0 otherwise.
6. Revenue sharing: if both levels of sub-national government regularly and un-
conditionally receive a share of national taxes, then the country receives a
score of 4 points. If there is no regular revenue sharing with either level of sub-
national government, or if both subnational governments receive funds, but
neither has any discretion over how they are spent, then the country receives
a score of 0 points. Any intermediate situation is given 2 points.
7. Authority on Education: if authority resides solely with the central government,
the country receives a score of 0 points. If authority is shared between the
central and regional governments, the score is 1 point. If authority is held
solely by the regional level of government, or is shared between the central and
local governments, the score is 2 points. If responsibility is shared between the
regional and local governments, the country is assigned 3 points. Finally, if
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authority resides solely at the local level of government, the country receives a
score of 4.
8. Authority on Infrastructure: same as 7 for infrastructure authority.
9. Authority on Policing: same as 7 for policing authority.
Evaluating each country according to these criteria we obtain a measure of decen-
tralization based on functional complexity, legal aspects and regional autonomy. Such
measure complements quantitative decentralization measures such as the spending
share described before.
AU
BE
BG HR
CY
CZ
DK
EE
FI
FR
GE
GR
HU
IC
IE
IT
LV
LT
LU
MT
NL
NO
PL
PT
RO
SLK
SLN
ES
SW
CH
UK
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
6 12 18 24 30 36
S p
e n
d i
n g
 D
e c
e n
t r
a l
i z
a t
i o
n
Kearney Index
Figure 3.2: Kearney index vs Average spending share, 1995-2007.
A comparison between the two measures will allow us to check how far away
from each other these two approaches are. Figure 3.2 shows the relation between
the Kearney index for the 31 countries of the sample and the average for the sample
period of the regional spending share. The correlation index between both measures
is 0.7711 and significant at 1% confidence level.
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The findings in figure 3.2 suggest that both measures offer a similar picture of
how decentralized is a given country, at least on average in the sample. Therefore,
since the Kearney index is time invariant I will use the regional spending share (and
the regional tax income share as an alternative) as the decentralization measure in
the empirical exercise that follows.
3.4.3 Data and methodology
The analysis on this section is based on a sample of 31 European countries: all
EU countries plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Due to data availability, my
analysis covers the 1995-2007 period. The main data sources are Eurostat and the
World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund. A complete list with
the sources and definitions of the data and some descriptive statistics can be found
in the Appendix on tables 3.5 and 3.6.
The main dependent variable, as explained before, will be the percentage of total
public spending carried out by sub-national governments out of total public spend-
ing. The main independent variable, capturing the indebtness of a country, will be
gross total public debt as a percentage of GDP. Some controls include: the current
account balance, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate or the median age of the
population, just to name a few.
A preliminary analysis of the data reveals that some issues need to be addressed.
First, the dependent variables tend to present a high degree of persistence, making
the use of a dynamic panel data model necessary. The regressions will includes the
lag of the dependent variable as a regressor to capture persistence and also potential
mean-reverting dynamics. Second, simple LM-tests point towards the existence of
heteroskedasticity. To address this issue, I will implement estimations of the variance-
covariance matrix robust to this problem, by clustering at the country level.
Finally, to address the problem of endogeneity between dependent and indepen-
dent variables, likely to arise in this setup, together with the aforementioned issues, I
would make use the Arellano-Bond (GMM) estimator. This estimator takes first dif-
ferences in the data to remove any unobserved time-invariant country-specific effect,
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and then instruments the right hand side variables in the first-differences equation
with lags of the series, under the assumption that the time-variant disturbances in
the original series are not serially correlated. In this cases where this assumption is
likely not true, the independent variable will be determined to be endogenous and
excluded from instrumentation.
3.4.4 Autonomy, borrowing limits and replications
In the following subsection, I test some of the hypothesis derived from the theoretical
model and try to replicate the results of two closely related papers with my dataset.
Transfers and autonomy
With the available data, I can check the government balance of the regions of a
country as a whole, just by subtracting the total regional government spending from
the regional total tax income. This exercise shows that regions have a negative
balance for every country of the sample and for every year. In the end, regions always
depend on government transfers to operate. This dependence is a very important fact
of the relation between the central government and the regions. As fiscal entities,
both the central government and the regions are capable of taxing, spending and
(in most countries) borrowing. Therefore, I claim that the main difference is the
existence of an economic dependence of the regions from the central government.
To test this hypothesis, I construct a measure of the tax autonomy of the regions,
simply dividing the total tax income by the total spending of the regions; a higher
number represents more tax autonomy (regions cover a higher percentage of their
spending with own taxes) and less dependence from central government’s transfers
and vice versa. Then, in a manner similar to the empirical analysis below, I construct
a series of regressions between total government debt and tax autonomy. According
to our hypothesis, a higher degree of tax autonomy should lead to more debt, as
the central government has less leverage to impose its desired fiscal policy from the
regions.
The results of this exercise can be checked in table 3.1. The table shows the results
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GMM OLS FE No small
Tax autonomy(-1) 0.025 0.044** 0.025 0.015
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Debt (-1) 0.821*** 0.973*** 0.861*** 0.822***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Gov. balance -0.622*** -0.415** -0.767*** -0.673***
(0.16) (0.20) (0.13) (0.16)
Unemployment rate 0.200 -0.109 0.072 0.210
(0.13) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14)
Current account -0.023 0.077 -0.018 -0.102
(0.15) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15)
Oil price 0.312 0.574 0.751 0.756
(0.74) (0.58) (0.82) (0.82)
Median age -18.229 -7.913 -17.831 -21.519
(14.01) (5.73) (15.01) (16.39)
Net exports 0.031 -0.007 0.035 0.118
(0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.13)
Constant 69.976 26.002 65.860 80.654
(50.10) (19.99) (53.56) (59.21)
R-squared 0.987 0.912
N of obs. 267 298 298 243
Table 3.1: Regressions results for debt-to-GDP ratio as a function of tax autonomy
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .90, .95 and .99 level, respectively
of a series of regressions using total debt as a percentage of GDP as dependent
variable and the lag of the tax autonomy measure and a number of controls as
regressors. All regressions include an estimation of the variance-covariance matrix
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robust to heteroskedasticity, by clustering at the country level. The benchmark
regression uses the Arellano-Bond (GMM) estimator, whereas the regressions using
pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions are included for reference. The last column
restricts the sample of the benchmark regression to exclude countries under 1 million
inhabitants. The regressions show some support to the initial hypothesis: more tax
autonomy, hence less dependence on transfers, for the regions tend to increase the
amount of debt that a country accumulates. It should be noted that this result have
a small degree of significance and is not robust to sample changes; further research
is required, but this rough analysis offers a good starting point.
The effect of borrowing limits
An important mechanism that could have a big effect on how the degree of decen-
tralization affects the level of total debt is the existence of borrowing limits on the
regions. By borrowing limits I refer to legislation that prevents the regions from
borrowing.
To measure the impact of this kind of regional borrowing limits on the debt level
of a country, first I construct a regional borrowing index, based on the database of
Qualitative Decentralization Indicators published by the World Bank.
This index goes from 0 (more limits on borrowing on the regions) to 10 (less
limits) and is constructed as follows: first, every country receives a base score. There
are four possible base scores: 0 points if the country does not allow the regions to
borrow, 4 points if there is a quantitative limit on the amount of debt the regions
can issue, 7 points if the limit is qualitative (for example, regions can only borrow
to build infrastructure) but not quantitative and 10 points if regions are allowed to
borrow freely. Second, points are deducted if the central government must approve
the decision of the regions to issue debt. In particular, 2 points are deducted if the
central government must approve any decision and 1 point is deducted if the central
government must be consulted only when borrowing from abroad.
Doing this for every country of the sample with available information (no data
for Cyprus, Luxemburg, Malta and Slovakia is available), I use this index to check
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the effects of this kind of limits on total debt. The correlation between the index
and total debt is 0.2576, were we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the correlation
being statistically different from zero. Unfortunately, the time invariant nature of
this measure prevents its inclusion in the empirical analysis of the next section.
The conclusion is that limits on the amount of borrowing of the regions have
little effect on the total amount of debt of a country. Therefore, there is no need to
consider this aspect when constructing the theoretical model.
Replication
As a final preliminary exercise, I replicate the results of two of the aforementioned
papers that make a similar analysis of decentralization as this paper: Asatryan, Feld,
and Geys (2012) and Rompuy (2012). Due to data availability, but keeping with the
spirit of these papers, I will use taxation decentralization as the decentralization
measure and introduce controls in line with those used in the next section.
Asatryan, Feld, and Geys (2012) studies, among other things, the effect of fiscal
decentralization on debt accumulation. It uses a sample of sample of 23 OECD
countries over the 1975-2000 period and concludes that there is no relation between
tax decentralization and general government debt. This paper uses first differences to
test the relation between the general government debt ratio and taxation autonomy,
measured as income from own and shared taxes as percentage of general government
revenue. On the other hand, Rompuy (2012) analyzes the effect of decentralization
on the fiscal balance, with a sample of 28 OECD countries over the period 1995-
2008. This paper concludes that tax revenue decentralization did not deteriorate
the budgetary outcomes of the central government; on the contrary, the relation is
positive, although with a 10% significance. In this case, the general government
balance as percentage of GDP is used as independent variable and the the sum of
the subcentral government’s own tax revenue and of the shared taxes expressed as a
percentage of the general government’s total tax revenue as the main regressor.
The replications can be seen in table 3.2. The first three columns correspond
to the replication of Rompuy (2012), so that the dependent variable is the general
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van Rompuy (2012) Asatryan et al. (2012)
OLS FE GMM FD FE GMM
Decentralization 0.026* 0.043 -0.098 0.008 -0.053 -0.027
(0.01) (0.04) (0.08) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11)
Dep. variable(-1) 0.808*** 0.368*** 0.347*** -0.029** 0.841*** 0.812***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Unemployment -0.033 -0.186*** -0.168** -0.007 0.409*** 0.427***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
Population -0.006* -0.303 -0.062 0.024* 0.562 0.597
(0.00) (0.23) (0.37) (0.01) (0.54) (0.61)
Median age -1.971 7.371** 9.230 -4.834 -19.159* -23.405**
(1.64) (3.12) (5.86) (8.19) (10.40) (11.93)
Constant 7.296 -21.097* -30.475 17.806 64.071* 79.824**
(5.86) (11.24) (19.28) (30.09) (35.93) (40.02)
R-squared 0.763 0.359 0.067 0.881
N of obs. 319 319 288 322 322 291
Table 3.2: Regressions results for government balance (A-C) and debt ratio (D-F)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .90, .95 and .99 level, respectively
goverment balance as percentage of GDP and the next three columns correspond to
the replication of Asatryan, Feld, and Geys (2012), so that the dependent variable
is the general government debt to GDP ratio. All regressions include an estimation
of the variance-covariance matrix robust to heteroskedasticity, by clustering at the
country level. The first column presents a simple OLS regression, the second column
a fixed effects panel regression and the third column uses the Arellano-Bond (GMM)
estimator. Then, the fourth column shows results of a first-differences regression, the
fifth column of a fixed effect panel regression and the last column the Arellano-Bond
(GMM) estimator.
The results of table 3.2 show that, as in Asatryan, Feld, and Geys (2012), there
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is no significant relation between decentralization and government debt. In the case
of the replication of Rompuy (2012), the regression finds no significant effect of de-
centralization on the fiscal position of the central government. This results contrasts
with that of Rompuy (2012), although is worth mentioning again that the significance
of the results in the paper was low.
3.4.5 The relation between decentralization and debt
The focus of my analysis is on the relation between the degree of decentralization of an
economy and its outstanding national debt. The latter will be the dependent variable
and it is measured by the ratio between total national public debt and gross domestic
product. In the benchmark model, the choice for the degree of decentralization is the
regional share of total public spending, with the regional share of total tax income
as alternative measure. I use the general government balance as a percentage of
GDP, unemployment rate, current account balance as a percentage of GDP, oil price,
average age and net exports as a percentage of GDP as controls in the benchmark
regression.
The results are in the first column of table 3.3. The general government balance
is defined as endogenous and excluded for instrumentation, as the time-variant dis-
turbances in the original series are likely serially correlated with this variable. As a
matter of comparison, I also include the results for the pooled OLS estimator (second
column) and the simple fixed effect estimator (third column), that are bound to be
affected by the problems mentioned before, but that nonetheless offer a measuring
stick about the importance of these issues. I perform some additional robustness
checks, like using an alternative measure of decentralization, the regional share of
tax income (fourth column) or excluding small countries, those under 1 million in-
habitants (fifth column). The data rejects the common wisdom that higher debt
levels are associated with more decentralized governments. The results are robust to
changes in the decentralization measure and the sample used.
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GMM OLS FE Tax decen. No small
Decentralization -0.008 -0.053* -0.072 0.084 -0.028
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
Debt-to-GDP(-1) 0.828*** 0.969*** 0.857*** 0.821*** 0.824***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Gov. balance -0.612*** -0.303 -0.732*** -0.625*** -0.663***
(0.15) (0.22) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16)
Unemployment rate 0.237* -0.044 0.071 0.302** 0.216
(0.13) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Current account -0.019 0.045 -0.031 -0.070 -0.095
(0.15) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Oil price 0.360 -0.067 0.699 0.186 0.848
(0.70) (0.58) (0.83) (0.64) (0.75)
Median age -13.983 1.460 -16.485 -11.039 -20.326
(13.74) (6.28) (14.20) (13.27) (14.99)
Net exports 0.052 0.033 0.066 0.054 0.136
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14)
Constant 54.835 -2.961 64.325 43.148 77.285
(49.16) (21.91) (49.85) (47.54) (54.38)
R-squared 0.987 0.912
N of obs. 272 303 303 289 246
Table 3.3: Regressions results for debt-to-GDP ratio as a function of fiscal decen-
tralization
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .90, .95 and .99 level, respectively
3.4.6 Further analysis
As we have seen on the empirical analysis above, the level of fiscal decentralization of
a country has no effect on the amount of debt it accumulates. In any case, the result
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obtained can be explored further. Even if there is no relation between decentral-
ization and debt, is there a relation between decentralization and the elements that
determine a country’s fiscal position and, in turn, its debt accumulation (government
spending, taxation income and interest payments)?
The answer for this question can be observed on table 3.4. In this table are
shown the results of regressing government spending (measured as Total government
spending as a percentage of GDP), income (measured as Total taxation income as
a percentage of GDP) and interest payments (measured as Net total interest pay-
ments as percentage of GDP) on decentralization (measured as the share of Total
public spending carried by non-central governments excluding GF01) and a number
of controls taken from the literature. As before, I am using data from 31 European
countries between 1995 and 2007. Two types of regressions are included for each
dependent variable: one using the Arellano-Bond (GMM) estimator and the other
using fixed effects, for comparison. On the GMM estimation, the variables for the
Unemployment rate and GDP per capita (plus Debt ratio in the case of the regression
for interest payments) are defined as endogenous, limiting their use as instruments.
As can be seen on table 3.4, fiscal decentralization has a negative and significant
effect on all the elements that influence the fiscal position of a country and its level
of debt. Keeping everything else equal, a country where the regional governments
carry out a larger share of total spending will observe lower levels of government
spending, tax income and interest payments as a percentage of GDP. Still, this
result is consistent with those of the previous section or the replication of Rompuy
(2012): even though more decentralized states tend to have smaller government sizes
(in terms of their fiscal components), these states do not accumulate more debt or
register higher levels of fiscal deficit because all the fiscal elements are negatively
affected.
On the other hand, these results offer some support to the “Leviathan hypothe-
sis”, first posted by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), who claimed that tax competi-
tion would limit government spending in decentralized countries, leading to smaller
governments in such states. We actually observe, according to the regressions, how
more decentralized countries tend to have, keeping everything else equal, smaller
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Spending to GDP Tax income to GDP Interest payments to GDP
GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE
Decentralization -0.158** -0.152** -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.023*** -0.028***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Dep. variable(-1) 0.444*** 0.448*** 0.701*** 0.735*** 0.716*** 0.678***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
Unemployment rate 0.031 0.131 -0.085 -0.066 -0.030* -0.033*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP per capita 0.280 0.727 0.335 0.409 -0.208 -0.343
(1.24) (0.85) (0.52) (0.48) (0.17) (0.27)
Median age -9.281 -10.832 -5.565 -5.808 -3.797** -3.533*
(9.70) (6.69) (5.64) (4.26) (1.54) (2.02)
Debt 0.057** 0.040** 0.024** 0.014 0.018*** 0.021***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Population 0.574* 0.526** 0.126 0.113 0.098*** 0.087**
(0.30) (0.24) (0.18) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03)
Current account -0.056 -0.117* -0.051 -0.044 0.017 0.011
(0.08) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 48.484 53.404** 29.182 29.169* 13.167** 12.955*
(30.83) (22.67) (19.78) (14.50) (5.43) (7.10)
R-squared 0.590 0.594 0.910
N of obs. 276 307 276 307 249 276
Table 3.4: Regressions results for different elements of public finances
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the .90, .95 and .99 level, respectively
governments (measured by the spending-to-GDP ratio), and the lower tax collection
could be a sign of tax competition. It should be noted, however, that the litera-
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ture that has studied the Leviathan hypothesis has usually focused on measures of
taxation decentralization. When re-running the regressions with taxation decentral-
ization instead of spending decentralization the significance disappears. Exploring
the relation between spending decentralization and government size is therefore an
interesting starting point for future research.
3.5 Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to answer the following question: does the level of re-
gional decentralization of a country affect their level of national debt? I answered
this question empirically by using a panel of 31 European countries in the last 18
years. Contrary to the common wisdom and existing theoretical predictions, the
data suggest no relation between decentralization and the level of debt.
Using an existing model by Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2008), but modifying it
to include more strategic players and a different timing, both to capture better the
characteristics of European states and to accommodate empirical facts of the data,
I test the common wisdom theoretically.
In this model, the first best allocation consist in full taxation smoothing across
regions and time. On the other hand, and consistently with Cooper, Kempf, and
Peled (2008), the decentralized equilibrium creates free-riding on the part of the
regions. This result comes from the inability of the central government to commit to
the first best allocation, together with its desire to avoid a default. Anticipating this,
the model predicts a common-pool problem: as taxation is costly in terms of utility,
the regional governments will try to spread the burden by issuing debt, knowing that
the central government will have the incentives to bail them out in the end. The
regions spend more and accumulate an excessive amount of debt, relative to the first
best allocation.
However, the central government has some leverage: the regions are economically
dependent of the transfer they receive from the central government. This dependency
arises from the fact that taxation is distortionary, and so the regions cannot raise
enough taxes in the first period to finance all their spending in the second period.
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Knowing this, the central government can credibly threaten the regions with cutting
part of their transfer if they do not control their spending. Because the threat
is credible, the regions react as the central government wants and the first best
allocation is achieved. The coercive ability of the central government leads to the
result observed in the empirical data of no relation between regional decentralization
and national debt.
The realization of the threat is an off-equilibrium event and so is never real-
ized; there would be no historical examples of it. We do have examples of central
governments threatening their regions, like the examples in Spain presented in the
introduction or the current situation in Bremerhaven, Germany. This city, a part
of the city-state of Bremen with its own Constitution and authority on policing and
education, has received pressure from the central government to curb its spending
or else lose some of its independence. It seems clear that central governments in
decentralized countries use their economic leverage to try to control the spending
decisions of the regions even if the threat is never realized, as the model suggests.
Furthermore, the basic principles of this situation have emerged during the ongo-
ing crisis in the Euro Area. The coercive mechanism has been particularly evident in
the negotiations for the bail-out packages of countries with financial troubles. These
negotiations have usually involved the adoption of an adjustment program in the
receiving countries (akin to the increased taxation from the regions in the model) in
exchange for the bail-out package (the transfer from the central government).
The nature of these negotiations reflects the imperfection of the Euro Area on
the fiscal side. The early literature on the creation of the Euro Area recognized the
necessity of fiscal transfers in order to cope with asymmetric crises of the kind we
are witnessing; see for example Wyplosz (1991) or Sala-i-Mart´ı and Sachs (1992). As
we have seen, the transfers are happening, in the form of bail-out packages, but only
after grueling negotiations. These processes generate uncertainty and delays which,
together with the successive failures of the Stability and Growth Pact, would suggest
moving the Euro Area further down the road of fiscal integration.
The main results of this paper support this idea. I have shown how, in the context
of a fiscal union, the central authority has the necessary instruments, in the form
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of coercion, to enforce an equilibrium in which the regions commit to a sustainable
path of taxation and debt, as long as the regions depend on transfers from the
central authority to meet their ends. In the context of the Euro Area, achieving this
configuration would imply a massive transfer of taxation and spending prerogatives
from the respective countries to the European authorities.
Obviously, the current political and economic context makes this kind of Euro
Area reform impossible. However, the creation of such a European Fiscal Union
would, in light of the results of this paper, solve the aforementioned policy problems:
on one hand, giving coercive power to the European authorities would help control
spending and debt on the member countries, something that the Stability and Growth
Pact has failed to do; on the other hand, the permanent nature of this fiscal structure
would eliminate the delays and uncertainty associated with the ad-hoc, case by case
nature of the current transfers scheme.
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Appendix
E Data and sources
Standard Deviation
Mean Overall Btwn Within Min Max Obs
Current account -0.48 5.88 5.30 2.59 -24.00 16.40 394
Debt-to-GDP 49.07 27.45 25.87 8.72 3.70 130.20 378
Decentralization 27.78 14.43 14.21 2.96 1.20 65.89 396
GDP per capita 2.61 0.95 0.91 0.30 -0.17 4.37 399
Gov. balance -1.74 3.85 3.82 2.16 -12.80 18.50 372
Gov. size 44.29 6.65 6.08 2.78 31.10 64.90 396
Median age 3.62 0.06 0.06 0.03 3.43 3.76 397
Net exports -0.07 8.10 7.68 3.08 -21.60 32.30 398
Oil price 3.21 0.49 - 0.49 2.43 3.97 403
Population 16.17 21.32 21.64 0.49 0.27 82.54 403
Unemployment rate 8.03 4.05 3.68 2.04 1.90 20.70 351
Urban population 72.52 12.70 12.84 1.13 50.46 98.09 403
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics
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Variable Description Source
Current account Current account surplus (+) or deficit
(-) as a percentage of GDP
World Economic Outlook, IMF
Debt Gross total debt as a percentage of
GDP
Eurostat, European Commission
Decentralization Subnational government spending as a
percentage of total government spend-
ing
Eurostat, European Commission
GDP per capita Real gross domestic product in euros
per capita, in logs
Eurostat, European Commission
Gov. Balance General government surplus (+) or
deficit (-) as a percentage of GDP
World Economic Outlook, IMF
Gov. Size General government total spending as
a percentage of GDP
World Economic Outlook, IMF
Median age Average age in years, in logs Eurostat, European Commission
Net exports Trade surplus (+) or deficit (-) as a per-
centage of GDP
Eurostat, European Commission
Oil price Europe Brent Spot Price FOB in dol-
lars per barrel, in logs
U.S. Energy Information Adminstra-
tion
Population Total population in millions, in logs Eurostat, European Commission
Unemployment rate Unemployed population as a percent-
age of total labor force
Eurostat, European Commission and
World Economic Outlook, IMF
Urban population Urban population as a percentage of to-
tal population
United Nations Population Division
Table 3.6: Data and sources
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